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INTRODUCTION
Our missiles sent the following message to Saddam Hussein:
When you abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors you
must pay a price .... Our objectives are limited, but clear: to
make Saddam pay a price for the latest act of brutality, reducing
his ability to threaten his neighbors and America's interests.'
On September 3, 1996 the United States initiated a cruise missile attack
on targets in southern Iraq in response to Iraqi military actions in northern
Iraq.2 In addition, the United States announced a sixty mile extension of the
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1998); B.A., Middlebury College (1992).
1. President Clinton quoted in, Raid On Iraq; Words of Clinton and Saddam Hussein:
Fiercely Clashing Views, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at A8.
2. See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1996, at A1 [hereinafter Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets].
On September 4, 1996, the United States launched a second missile strike against Iraq. See
Allison Mitchell, U.S. Launches Further Strike Against Iraq After Clinton Vows He Will Extract
"Price," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
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no-fly zone in southern Iraq, which had been imposed by the Gulf War
coalition in the aftermath of the war against Iraq.3 The United States was
responding to the movement of Iraqi ground troops into the Kurdish safe• 4
haven and their subsequent attacks on the Kurdish population. Iraqi
forces acted pursuant to a request for assistance by the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party (KDP) in its ongoing confrontation with another Kurdish
nationalist organization, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).5 The
United States did not seek UN authorization for the intervention, nor did
it fully consult with or gain the support of the members of the Gulf War
coalition.6 Many nations, including Russia, China, Jordan, and France,
criticized this unilateral action by the United States.7
In the days following the intervention, the U.S. State Department of-
fered various justifications and explanations for the U.S. military action,
most of which invoked the legacy of the Gulf War.! The State Department
explained that the military intervention was necessary to protect U.S. na-
tional security, to contain an Iraqi threat to neighboring countries, to
enforce general norms of international law, to protect Kurdish human
rights, and to enforce UN Resolutions 688 and 678 and the no-fly zones
established to protect the Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf War.9 Re-
3. See Mitchell, supra note 2. The Gulf War ended in 1991.
4. See Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets, supra note 2.
5. See Christi Parsons & Storer H. Rowley, Signs Hint At U.S. Strike Against Iraq;
Hussein Pushing Deeper Into Kurds'Safe Zone, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1996, at IN ("A civil war
between the two main rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq prompted Saddam Hussein to
intervene on behalf of... the KDP... against... the PUK:').
6. See Craig R. Whitney, From Allies, U.S. Hears Mild Applause or Silence, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1996, at A10 ("French officials said... the decision to extend the no-flight zone had
been made without consulting them .... Russia called today's American air strikes 'an inappro-
priate and unacceptable reaction to the latest events in northern Iraq."'); Nicholas Burns, U.S.
Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #140 (Sept. 3, 1996) (visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript
available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing #140] ("The fact is this was a unilat-
eral U.S. military action .... There was no need for Security Council action.").
7. See Whitney, supra note 6 ("The rest of the world, including most of America's NATO
allies in Europe, made it clear that the United States was on its own in taking military action
against Iraq."); Mitchell, supra note 2 ("Despite a weekend of diplomatic activity, the Admini-
stration drew only limited support from its allies .... France and Spain said diplomatic action
would have been preferable .... The Arab world was.., divided and Russia and China were
both sharply critical of the move.").
Reports prior to the military attack indicated that the intervention had been scheduled for an
earlier date and then scuttled due to a lack of support from U.S. allies. Jordan, for example,
refused to allow U.S. warplanes employ Jordanian facilities. See Parsons & Rowley, supra note 5.
'8. For purposes of convenience in this note, unless otherwise indicated, "intervention" re-
fers to both the U.S. military strikes and the unilateral extension of the no-fly zone.
Interestingly, the U.S. State Department made no official statement clearly outlining the ba-
sis in international law for the intervention. Instead, justification were proffered in response to
questions from journalists and criticism from foreign powers.
9. The State Department intimated that the transfer of forty to fifty thousand Iraqi troops
across the no-fly zone and Saddam Hussein's status as a "criminal" and "international outlaw"
[Vol. 19:581
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gardless of the rationale offered, military intervention against a sovereign
nation"0 is controversial under international law because it threatens to
violate the sovereign rights of nations and to expand the traditional defi-
nition of acceptable use of military force." The litany of justifications
offered by the State Department thus deserves careful scrutiny.
In focusing on a single incident between two sovereign nations, this
note seeks to illustrate how international law is employed and/or ignored
in practice and what this indicates about the efficacy of international law
generally. Of particular interest is the actual importance of the principles
of international law to countries contemplating military intervention.
Compliance with international law and custom is the best indication of
the true importance of international law to a nation. Therefore, the legal-
ity of the intervention should reveal something about the U.S. view of
international law. Determining whether the intervention was wholly uni-
lateral or a multilateral endeavor also is crucial to a legal analysis of the
action because unilateral military intervention rarely is justified under
international law. This inquiry attempts to discover if the United States
obeys the strictures of international law when it acts internationally or if
international law is simply an afterthought in the formulation and execu-
tion of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. actions are evaluated not just in light of
international law, but also in relation to U.S. claims regarding its motives
and justifications. An exploration of the relationship between U.S. claims
and U.S. actions on the world stage, and the inconsistencies inherent
therein, is perhaps the most telling part of the overall analysis.
This note concludes that none of the various legal arguments offered
in support of the September 1996 military intervention against Iraq ade-
quately justifies U.S. actions under international law and that in fact
international law was never a real concern in planning, implementing, or
even justifying the intervention. Part I relates the general history of the
"Kurdish problem" and the particulars of the incident under scrutiny. This
justified the U.S. military intervention and suggested that to forestall further attacks Iraq must
"stop the brutalization of the Kurdish population." Briefing #140, supra note 6. It was also con-
tended that the United States acted because it was in its "compelling, vital national interests"
and that the "clear basis for this action.., is U.N. Security Council 688." Id. Resolution 678
also was cited. See Glyn Davies, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #141 (Sept. 4, 1996)
(visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing
#141]. In addition, the United States acted "to limit the expansionist and aggressive behavior of
Saddam Hussein, which is a current threat to his Arab neighbors." Briefing #140, supra note 6.
10. Despite the limitations imposed on Iraq's sovereignty in the wake of the Gulf War, the
United States has continually affirmed that the sovereign territory of Iraq includes the Kurdish
safe havens and no-fly zones. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("[T]he United States has never
questioned the territorial integrity of Iraq."). The intervention thus did violate Iraq's sovereignty.
11. For an overview of the importance of the principle of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign states, see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27) (Judgment).
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Part then goes on to describe the aftermath of the intervention and its fail-
ure to achieve any of the stated goals of the United States. Part II
addresses the general validity under international law of military inter-
vention in internal affairs of sovereign states, with particular attention to
humanitarian intervention, and concludes that the intervention was con-
trary to international law. Part III explores the UN position on military
intervention, conduct authorized under UN resolutions regarding Iraq and
the Kurds, and the legal parameters of the no-fly zones in Iraq, conclud-
ing that the intervention was not a valid enforcement of UN policies or
resolutions. Part IV critiques the apparent U.S. belief that it can override
generally accepted norms of international law by defining its concerns as
national security issues. Finally, Part V looks to the practical impact of
international law in this matter and what the intervention and its after-
math, including widespread condemnation of the U.S. action, reveal about
the geopolitical realities of international law.
I. A HISTORY OF THE IRAQI KURDS, EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE
INTERVENTION, AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE U.S. ATTACKS12
"The Kurds have the twofold distinction of having been, for the past
sixty-five years, one of the most heavily repressed minorities and one of
the most numerous . . . " Since the creation of Iraq, the Kurds have
sought independence and autonomy, and Iraqi military forces have bru-
tally crushed every such effort.' 4 The regime of Saddam Hussein has
responded to Kurdish resistance to Iraqi rule in a manner all too familiar:
in 1988 alone as many as 182,000 Kurds were killed and 4,000 Kurdish
villages destroyed by Iraqi forces. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror
against the Kurds has continued for over fifteen years and has involved
the use of chemical weapons and the forced displacement of Kurdish
12. The Kurds are "[a] non-Arab people with distinctive linguistic and cultural characteris-
tics and an undimmed national consciousness... [who] have lived in a territory straddling
present-day Iraq, Turkey and Iran for over 4,000 years." Navneet Sharma, Gulf Crisis: Gunboat
Diplomacy, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asia Library, Indtod File.
13. GERARD CHALIAND, THE KURDISH TRAGEDY 3 (1994).
14. See id. at 57 ("The history of Iraqi Kurdistan has repeated itself ceaselessly throughout
these years: succeeding governments in Baghdad have made concessions to Kurdish nationalists
at times of weakness of the central state. Then, as soon as circumstances permit, and because
they have been unable to accept a Kurdish autonomy... they take up the offensive once
more"). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE
(1995) (detailing Iraqi repression of the Kurds).
15. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
STAFF REPORT ON KURDISTAN IN THE TIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 56 (Comm. Print 1991)
(primarily authored by Peter W. Galbraith) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON KURDISTAN];
CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 11; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note 14, at xv.
[Vol. 19:581
Force Without Law
villagers." This campaign to eradicate the Kurdish presence in Iraq has
been systematic and brutal. 7
At the end of the Gulf War, Kurdish insurrections occurred through-
out Iraqi Kurdistan."8 The Iraqi army brutally suppressed these uprisings. 19
While the Gulf War coalition enforced a ban on fixed wing aircraft in
northern Iraq, it allowed Iraq to employ helicopters in its efforts to crush
Kurdish resistance. As a result of Iraq's military aggression, approxi-
mately two million Kurds fled their homes, streaming into Iran and the
area near the Turkish border.2' President Bush ordered U.S. military
forces to enter northern Iraq to address the growing humanitarian crisis.22
The massive humanitarian and refugee disaster caused by the clashes
between Iraqi forces and the Kurds prompted the United States and coali-
tion allies to establish safe havens or security zones for the Kurds in
northern Iraq.23 These safe havens were protected by no-fly zones which
prohibited Iraqi aircraft from operating in Kurdish areas. The coalition
forces claimed authority for the no-fly zones through UN Resolution 688,
which condemned Iraq's repression of the Kurds.24
The history of the Kurdish struggle has also been one of bitter dissen-
sion between competing Kurdish nationalist groups. 25 These struggles
26
have arisen out of both ideological and personal friction. As early as
1966, Kurdish factions squared off against each other militarily, with the
followers of one group assisting Baghdad in battling another Kurdish
27
group. More recently, following a brief period of harmony at the end of
the Gulf'War, Kurdish factions began skirmishing with one another in
28northern Iraq in 1992. Baghdad's military efforts on behalf of the KDP
16. See CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 11. See generally STAFF REPORT ON KURDISTAN,
supra note 15.
17. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note 14, at 4-6 ("With the granting
of emergency powers to al-Majid [a cousin of Saddam Hussein placed in control of northern
Iraq] in March 1987, the intermittent counterinsurgency against the Kurds became a campaign
of destruction.").
18. See CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 1-2.
19. See id.




24. See Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at A2. ("The United Nations did not create
the zone and disputes the assertion that the Security Council resolution authorizes one").
25. See CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 60.
26. See id. at 56-61.
27. See id. at 60.
28. See John Lancaster, Kurd Chief Warns He May Call Again on Iraq for Help, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File ("In the aftermath of the
Persian Gulf War, the Kurds... seemed to make some progress toward their long-cherished
Winter 1998]
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against the PUK in August 1996 thus fit into a historical pattern. Iraqi
military involvement in Kurdish civil strife is a proven means for the cen-
tral government to divide and repress the Kurdish people. Thus, while the
Kurds unified briefly after the Gulf War, they quickly reverted to a tragi-
cally customary pattern of division and conflict.
Since the Gulf War, U.S. involvement with the Kurds has continued,
albeit in a more subdued manner, and yet the plight of the Kurds has
changed little. The United States assisted in peace talks between Kurdish
factions and, with its coalition allies, continued to patrol and enforce the
no-fly zones in Iraq.' ° Along with other coalition countries, the United
States engaged in military strikes against Iraq in 1993 in response, in part,
to Iraqi threats to the Kurdish population. The United States has re-
mained abreast of the situation and portrayed itself as a defender of the
Kurds.32
In the aftermath of the Gulf War the Kurds faced an uncertain future.
The wide-ranging Kurdish uprising which followed the war resulted in
the establishment of a security zone in northern Iraq by allied forces, but
3the status of the Kurds remained ambiguous. They were neither sover-
eign nor citizens. Protected by foreign military might, the Kurdish
population's demands for autonomy and independence have been consis-
tently ignored by Baghdad and sabotaged by internal conflict.
34
Tensions erupted in August 1996. Iraqi troops were reported to be
moving into Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, and the KDP and PUK faced
goal of autonomy in northern Iraq. Then, in 1992 fighting started between the two main Kurdish
factions....").
29. See id.; R.W. Apple, Jr., How To Slap Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at A6.
30. See Apple, supra note 29. (The United States has "sought to promote Kurdish unity
through sporadic mediation efforts."); Briefing #141, supra note 9 (indicating that Great Britain,
France and the United States are responsible for enforcing the no-fly zones).
31. See Ian Johnstone, Aftermath of the Gulf War. An Assessment of UN Action, INT'L
PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 37 (Int'l Peace Academy, New York, NY)
(1994). The United States cited an alleged assassination plot by Iraq against President Bush as
the primary justification for the 1993 intervention. See Mitchell, supra note 2.
32. See Nicholas Bums, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #145 (Sept. 10, 1996)
(visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing
#145] ("Our very clear intention.., is to help [the Kurds] mediate their political differences.
This is a long-standing commitment by us."); Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("We have been in
northern Iraq through 'Operation Provide Comfort' for five years in order to continue to protect
the Kurdish people."). See generally STAFF REPORT ON KURDISTAN, supra note 15 (analyzing
the plight of the Kurds after the failed 1991 uprising).
33. See CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 3.
34. See id. Feuding Kurdish factions reached an "agreement of principle on the status of
Iraqi Kurdistan." Id. Saddam Hussein did not offer autonomy to the unified Kurds.
[Vol. 19:581
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off militarily.35 Following several U.S. mediated attempts to establish a
cease-fire between the warring KDP and PUK factions in August 1996,
the KDP apparently requested that Baghdad intervene on its behalf."
Happy to comply, Saddam Hussein's troops marched across the boundary
of the no-fly zone into northern Iraq.37 Within a week, the U.S. military
attacked positions in southern Iraq with cruise missiles."
The attacks ceased on September 4, 1996, one day after they began,
and the United States declared the intervention a success despite the fact
that none of the various goals of the September 1996 military intervention
presented by the State Department were in fact achieved.39 This note ar-
gues that many, if not all, of the U.S. justifications for the military
intervention were not genuine and in fact served as pretexts for the true
motives of the United States. One means of testing the legitimacy of these
proffered rationales for the intervention is to analyze the actual accom-
plishments of the military action. It seems appropriate to analyze the
reasons offered for the intervention in light of the actual achievements of
the action. Putting aside all of the explanations, justifications, and rhetoric
proffered by the United States as grounds for the September 1996 inter-
vention, the fact remains that little if anything was gained as a result of
35. See Glyn Davies, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #138 (Aug. 28, 1996)
(visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing
#138].
36. See id.; Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets, supra note 2 ("[T]he [Iraqi] Government
announced that it had intervened on behalf of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in its struggle for
supremacy with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan:').
37. See Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets, supra note 2.
38. Strikes were carried out on September 3, and September 4, 1996. See id.
39. See Nicholas Bums, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #149 (Sept. 16, 1996)
(visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing
#149] ("We've set up a strategic containment policy to deter [Saddam] from being an aggressor
against his neighbors, and we are succeeding in that."); Nicholas Burns, U.S. Dep't of State,
Daily Press Briefing #148 (Sept. 13, 1996) (visited Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at
<http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing #148] ("[I]n the past two weeks we've been able
to actually constrain Saddam Hussein's military movements."); Briefing #140, supra note 6
(The demonstration of military force "seems to have been highly effective."). See also Jonathan
C. Randal, Iraq Pulls Back, But Fighting Continues, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Sept. 6, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Atmsun File [hereinafter Randall ("President Clinton has
described [the action] as a successful U.S. intervention?').
Justifications for the intervention offered by the State Department include: Iraq's military
actions breached the no-flight zones; Iraq breached "international rules" and international law;
Iraq took criminal actions against the Kurds; Iraq's actions implicated "compelling, vital na-
tional interests" of the United States; Iraq posed a threat to Israel and its Arab neighbors; see
Briefing #140, supra note 6; Iraq's actions violated U.N. Resolutions 688 & 678. See Briefing
#141, supra note 9; Iraq's "pursuit of weapons of mass destruction" posed a threat to other na-
tions; see Glyn Davies, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #147 (Sept. 12, 1996) (visited Feb.
11, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing #147]; Iraq's ac-
tions threatened the "stability in the flow of oil" to the United States; see Briefing #148, supra.
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the military action. In fact, the most significant results did not injure but
instead actually strengthened the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The most obvious and immediate result of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq was the disintegration of the Gulf War coalition. Within hours of
the initial cruise missile attack, coalition members harshly criticized the
action.4' Differences among coalition members had arisen in the years
since the Gulf War; however, a semblance of unity remained. The nearly
universal condemnation of the U.S. military intervention in September
1996 was the death knell of the coalition.4' Arab nations decried foreign
intervention in Iraq and Western allies refused to participate in patrolling
41
the extended no-fly zone.
Iraq emerged from the conflict of September 1996 as a potentially
greater regional threat to peace and stability than it had been only weeks
earlier.44 Subsequent to the military strikes by the United States, Iraqi
forces withdrew partially from the areas they had invaded in northern
Iraq.45 However, Saddam Hussein maintained a presence in the region,
and his exertion of power and influence reestablished Iraqi sovereignty in
northern Iraq.46 The success of Iraq's military encroachment into northern
40. See Brian Duffy et al., Back to Iraq: Desert Strike, The President's Decision To Disci-
pline Saddam Hussein May Be The Beginning Of A New Conflict, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 16, 1996, at 34 ("[T]he broad coalition that fought under America's leadership in Desert
Storm is no longer.").
41. See Whitney, supra note 6.
42. "'It was American unilateralism that sealed the collapse of the Gulf War coalition be-
cause the United States failed to consider the views of the majority of coalition members."'
Geneive Abdo, Defense Chief In Turkey To Boost Support: Clinton Says No Confrontation
Sought With Saddam Hussein, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Dalnws File (quoting Samia Nkrumah, a political analyst in Cairo,
Egypt).
43. See Arab League Condemns US Missile Attack on Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Sept. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3917344 [hereinafter Arab League Condemns US Attack,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE]; Randal, supra note 39.
44. See John Donnelly, Stunning Shift: Arabs Want Saddam 'Rehabilitated', SUNDAY
GAZETTE-MAIL, Sept. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5210619 (suggesting that Iraq's newly
gained confidence in its ability to exercise control over its territory and stand up to the United
States have led to fears in the Middle East that Iraq will be bolder and more aggressive in the
future in the region).
45. See id.; Mariam Shahin, After The Storm: the aftermath of the Sep. 1996 US action in
Iraq, THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13068437 (reporting claims that
Iraqi agents were circulating in Kurdistan, killing opponents).
46. See Donnelly, supra note 44 ("Hussein hasn't been this strong since before he invaded
Kuwait in August 1990. He exercises a semblance of control over northern Iraq again; the oppo-
sition is in tatters, and he executed many of his supposed 'assassins.' ").
The State Department acknowledged this reality following the intervention. See Nicholas
Burns, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #151 (Sept. 18, 1996) (visited Feb. 11, 1998)
(transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) ("[Slome of Saddam's security forces remain in
northern Iraq, exerting a nefarious influence there."); Briefing #145, supra note 32 ("There's no
[Vol. 19:581
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Iraq and the general consensus that the United States had intervened in an
internal Iraqi matter substantially increased Iraq's stature in the Arab
world.47 Far from feeling less threatened by Iraq, neighboring nations saw
Iraq's military endeavor as signaling the return of a strong and aggressive
Iraqi military, newly emboldened after its arguably successful confronta-
41tion with the United States.
The situation of the Kurds remained unchanged after the U.S. inter-
vention. The indeterminacy of their status and their humanitarian
suffering continued unabated, as it had prior to the intervention. Fighting
among the KDP and PUK persisted after the United States declared its
intervention a success.49 In fact, Kurdish leaders contended that foreign
military involvement in northern Iraq, including fighting by Iraqi forces,
was ongoing after the U.S. intervention." Within days of the intervention,
the Kurds threatened again to seek the assistance of Iraqi forces and de-
cried U.S. inconsistency and ineffectiveness in alleviating the ongoing
humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq."' In fact, weeks later, through
question that Saddam Hussein ha[s] taken advantage of this window over the last couple of
weeks to enhance [his] position in the north.").
47. See Donnelly, supra note 44 (Jordan "called on the United States to start a dialogue
with Iraq" and questioned the wisdom of the US military action in the region.); Duffy, supra
note 40, at 34; Abdo, supra note 42.
48. See Duffy, supra note 40, at 39 ("[T]he latest episode may very well embolden
Hussein.").
49. See Lancaster, supra note 28 ("[I]n a brisk counteroffensive that began on Oct. 10, Ta-
labani's [PUK] forces recaptured Sulaymaniyah and have since recovered most of the territory
they lost last month with the exception of Irbil.").
The State Department acknowledged that Iraq remained a serious threat to the Kurds. See
Glyn Davies, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #142 (Sept. 5, 1996) (visited Feb. 11,
1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing #142] ("[Saddam]
introduced a massive security presence in the area under cover of these deployments .... So his
troops remain very much a threat to Iraq's civilian population in the north.").
In addition, this internecine fighting among the Kurds sparked a refugee crisis in northern
Iraq. Estimates of the number of displaced Kurds were as high as one hundred thousand. See
Nicholas Burns, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing #146 (Sept. 11, 1996) (visited Feb. 11,
1998) (transcript available at <http://www.state.gov>) [hereinafter Briefing #146]; Briefing
#145, supra note 32.
50. See Jonathan C. Randal, Conflict Spreads in North Iraq As Kurds Battle, Turks Bomb,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at Al ("Patriotic Union leader Talabani declared at his headquarters
here near the Iranian border that 30 Iraqi tanks and 30 armored personnel carriers, along with
heavy artillery, took part in Barzani's assault on his forces near Irbil."). The State Department
acknowledged that Iraq was involved in military actions in the north. See Briefing #145, supra
note 32 (stating "[w]e believe that Saddam's forces played a part in this [post-intervention]
military offensive [in Sulaimaniya].").
51. See Lancaster, supra note 28 ("Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani warned yesterday that
he is considering another appeal to the Iraqi government for help in defeating a rival Kurdish
group said to be receiving arms and support from Iran."); Kurt Schork, Kurd Chief Finds Fault
With West, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Sept. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7048347 ("The
Kurdish militia leader now running northern Iraq said Thursday that the West's failure to spell
Winter 1998]
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negotiation, the United States was able to achieve what its military inter-
vention utterly failed to accomplish: a cease-fire was brokered between
the KDP and the PUK and the fighting stopped.52
Far from protecting petroleum reserves, the U.S. intervention caused
substantial turmoil in oil markets." Prices rose substantially and contin-
ued instability in the region threatened to seriously disrupt the oil
market.54 This disruption was caused in part by a reduction in supply
caused by the scrapping of Resolution 986, an oil for food deal.55 Thus,
even if its concern over petroleum reserves was legitimate, ultimately the
United States initiated the troubles it sought to avoid.
As far as enforcement of UN resolutions and policy are concerned,
since the intervention, the United Nations and Iraq have continued to
quarrel over monitoring of Iraq's program for weapons of mass destruc-
56tion. In fact, on several occasions in 1997 the Security Council
out goals for the Kurds drove him into the arms of Saddam Hussein."); Sharma, supra note 12
("Both the... KDP... and the ... PUK... blame the US for their present predicament.").
52. See Discussions on Monitoring of Northern Iraq Ceasefire, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Nov. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12176049.
53. See supra note 39 (the U.S. claimed it acted in part to protect oil reserves).
54. See Oil Prices Soar After US Missiles Strike Iraq, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST,
Sept. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11146452 ("World oil prices rose to levels not seen since
the 1991 Gulf War after the US replied to Iraqi troop incursions into the Kurdish-held north of
Iraq with a volley of cruise missiles... ).
55. "Under [Resolution 986] Iraq would be allowed to sell dlrs 2 billion worth of oil for an
initial 180-day period to buy food and medicine for its people suffering the effects of six years
of U.N. sanctions." Robert H. Reid, Security Council Considers Response to Iraq's Incursions
Against Kurds, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5404461.
56. Iraqi intransigence resurfaced in the fall of 1997. See Farouk Choukri, Iraq Launches
Attack On New UN Disarmament Chief, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 11, 1997, available in
1997 WL 13411890 ("[T]he UN arms inspection team in Iraq on Monday reported to the UN
Security Council that Baghdad is continuing to conceal weaponry from the UN inspectors.");
Barbara Crossette, U.S. Fails to Impose New Punishment on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at
A5 (The United States criticized the fact that "Iraq continued to obstruct efforts to destroy its
major weapons systems.").
In November 1997 Iraq declared that all UN weapons inspectors of U.S. nationality would
be expelled from the country. In the escalating war of words which followed, the United States
made every effort to recognize UN jurisdiction in the matter and gain Security Council approval
for an enforcement action. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Ask U.N. to Force Iraq to Admit Arms
Monitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at Al (quoting Bill Richardson, U.S. delegate to the
United Nations) ("This is not a fight between the U.S. and Iraq. This is Iraq confronting the
United Nations."); id. ("Clinton Administration officials said today that they would ask the
United Nations Security Council... to take swift and firm action to force President Saddam
Hussein of Iraq to allow Americans into his country as members of a United Nations weapons
inspection team."); Barbara Crossette, Iraq Threatens To Shoot Down U.S. Spy Planes, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at Al ("The Clinton Administration, under pressure from Congress to
react forcefully to Iraq, has tried to contain the dispute within the United Nations system, where
Washington can count on the backing of the Security Council. Any independent use of force by
the United States without Council approval would shatter that unity at this point."). More recent
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contemplated imposing further sanctions on Iraq for its failure to cooper-
ate with UN inspectors." Iraq has become no more compliant or
cooperative, nor less threatening on the world stage. The pre-intervention
rhetoric of the United States may have played a role in the UN decision
temporarily to scuttle approval of Resolution 986, which was to authorize
the humanitarian sale of oil for food and medicine for the Iraq." Regard-
less of the U.S. role in the decision to delay implementation of Resolution
986, the determination was made prior to the intervention. In addition,
this accomplishment in fact exacerbated humanitarian troubles in Iraq by
eliminating a source of humanitarian relief to the long-suffering Iraqi
civilian population.
The United States ceased military activity despite widespread belief
in the international community that Saddamn Hussein was left better off
militarily and politically than he was prior to the U.S. cruise missile at-
61tacks. Iraqi military and security forces remained a serious threat to
Kurds in northern Iraq and Saddam claimed victory over the foreign in-
vaders. At the end of the day, Iraq found itself in closer solidarity with its
Arab neighbors than it had been for years by having asserted its sover-
eignty in northern Iraq, by having succeeded in violently repressing and
intimidating Kurdish insurgents, and by having stood up to the United
States. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was sufficiently emboldened by his
success in northern Iraq again to defy the United States and the interna-
tional community in 1997 and 1998 by forcing UN weapons inspectors to
leave Iraq and demanding an end to the UN weapons inspection program
62altogether.
rhetoric by the United States suggests that this new approach to international law and the United
Nations was short-lived. See infra Epilogue.
57. See Barbara Crossette, U.S. Fails to Get U.N. Backing To Widen Sanctions On Iraq,
N.Y. TimS, Oct. 23, 1997, at A5 ("The United States lost its battle to impose new sanctions on
Iraq."); John M. Goshko, Council May Condemn Iraqi Moves; U.N. Draft Drops Wording For
'Serious Consequences', WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1997, at A 18.
58. See Briefing #140, supra note 6. In any event, the deal eventually went into effect in
December 1996.
59. See Myers, U.S. Attacks Military Targets, supra note 2, at A6 ("[T]he United States
called for the suspension [of the oil-for-food deal] as a punitive measure" prior to the missile
strikes.).
60. See Sharma, supra note 12 ("Many countries find [the U.S. position on the oil-for-food
deal] morally repugnant, particularly in view of American protestations about helping the peo-
ple of Iraq,").
61. See Randal, supra note 39 ("[T]he Kurdish-inhabited region of northern Iraq [is] mired
in conflict despite what President Clinton has described as a successful U.S. intervention and
the reported pullback of Iraqi army armor and artillery.").
62. See Thomas W. Lippman, Iraq to Back Down, Albright, U.N. Told; Baghdad Says In-
spectors Can Return, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at A1; infra Epilogue (discussing continuing
Iraqi defiance of the UN).
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II. MILITARY INTERVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
MULTILATERALISM
The primary justifications for the intervention put forth by the United
States were grounded in humanitarian concerns. The no-fly zones upon
which the United States relied were set up after the Gulf War as a means
of protecting the Iraqi Kurds and UN Security Council Resolution 688
was designed to serve humanitarian ends. 3 Furthermore, the actual events
which spurred the United States to action threatened the Kurdish minority
in Iraq, but did not directly jeopardize other international interests. This
was an internal Iraqi matter: no foreign boundaries were crossed and no
threat to international peace and security was evident. Thus, unlike other
justifications offered by the United States, which seem to fall under the
umbrella of U.S. national security interests or rules established by the
United Nations, the humanitarian justification deserves independent
analysis with an eye toward international law's evolving attitude toward
humanitarian intervention. '
Ascertaining whether the intervention was multilateral or a wholly
unilateral U.S. action is crucial to any determination of its legality as a
humanitarian intervention. In this regard, U.S. claims concerning the
multilateral nature of the military intervention suggest a blurring of the
line between unilateral and multilateral action. This confusion between
these concepts may provide insight into the U.S. understanding or misun-
derstanding of international law generally, not just in the humanitarian
sphere.
The independence, autonomy, and authority of nation'states is the
foundation of modem international law. 6' Respect for the territorial and
63. See infra Part III.
64. Statements by the State Department indicate that in claiming that the intervention was
necessary to enforce international rules, the United States was relying specifically on UN reso-
lutions, national security issues or humanitarian concerns. See infra Parts III-IV (exploring these
justifications).
65. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2d ed.
1995) ("The contemporary system of international relations is built on the assumption that the
nation-state is the primary actor."); Thomas G. Otte, Military Intervention: Conclusions and
Reflections, in MILITARY INTERVENTION: FROM GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY TO HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 193, 197 (Andrew M. Dorman & Thomas G. Otte eds., 1995) [hereinafter Otte,
Conclusions & Reflections] (arguing that despite an increasingly liberal attitude toward inter-
vention, state sovereignty remains a crucial underpinning of international law as exemplified by
the worldwide reaction to Iraq's forcible annexation of Kuwait); J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 (9th ed. 1984) ("The modern system of international law.., remains
tinged with concepts such as national and territorial sovereignty, and the perfect equality and
independence of states."); John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions
for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 538 (1993) ("The traditional concept of international law was
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political sovereignty of States is a key feature of the international legal
66order. The natural and inevitable corollary of this respect for sovereignty
is the international legal prohibition on interference by a nation in the
sovereign territory or affairs of another.67 This prohibition has been a nec-
essary and essential element of the international legal system for
68centuries. Efforts by the United States to justify the military intervention
in Iraq must be viewed in this context. While never refuting the fact that
military intervention generally is prohibited under international law, the
United States nevertheless sought to justify the intervention as appropriate
69and necessary.
While the inviolability of state sovereignty is one of the foundations
of modem international law and international relations, this flat prohibi-
tion appears to be yielding somewhat to grave humanitarian concerns."
one of law between nations."); Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833 (1990) (book review) ("[T]he basic rule of interna-
tional law is that a state generally has the exclusive authority to regulate conduct within its
territory.").
Repeated assurances by. the United States that it recognized the sovereignty of Iraq over all
of its territory, while simultaneously violating that sovereignty, suggest that, at least in theory,
sovereignty remains sacrosanct under the U.S. understanding of international law. See supra
note 11.
66. See Louis HENKEN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 18 (1968) ("[E]very foreign policy as-
sumes the integrity and inviolability of the national territory.").
67. See Thomas G. Otte, On Intervention: Some Introductory Remarks, in MILITARY
INTERVENTION: FROM GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 3, 5
(Andrew M. Dorman & Thomas G. Otte eds., 1995) ("Military intervention is ... a deviation
from the internationally acknowledged norm of non-intervention .... The cornerstone of the
Westphalian international order is the principle of state sovereignty."); ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 9 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1994)
[hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT]; Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention In Internal
Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, And Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 519 (1994) ("Nonintervention is a
fundamental principle of international law.').
The UN Charter prohibits military interventions in the internal affairs of foreign nations.
See UN CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7; infra Part III.
68. See ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 67, at 9 ("[T]he international legal system [is]
committ[ed] to a norm against external involvement in internal affairs. The norm originated in
unwritten custom.., and has been codified in the present century in a series of treaties and
other documents.").
69. While the United States attempted to justify the intervention as an enforcement of in-
ternational law generally or "the rules of the road' it never elaborated on this explanation. See
Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("So I think the justification for this is clear. You cannot have
agreed-upon rules in the international system flouted by international outlaws."). These broad
statements about the basis for the military intervention are best viewed as vague generalizations
of more specific justifications.
70. In support of this, Thomas Weiss states:
In the aftermath of the Cold War, we are moving in fits and starts away from the idea
that state sovereignty serves as an all-purpose rationalization for narrowly defined
national interests, and lurching towards a world in which states are more accountable
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Multilateral efforts designed. to address serious violations of human rights
can and have overridden the traditional concern for state sovereignty; how-
ever, unilateral intervention remains highly controversial.7 The Clinton
administration initially recognized explicitly the importance of consensus
within the international community and strove to implement a foreign pol-
icy agenda "with a multilateral emphasis on deliberations regarding military
intervention."72 Thus, the increasing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention
in sovereign nations has occurred primarily in the context of multilateral
action. There are significant dangers inherent in unilateral intervention, such
as the possibility that unilateral action will reflect the self-interested action
of the intervening nation and multilateralism, mitigates these risks.73 In
for their actions, inside or outside of their borders .... In short, sovereignty is no
longer a safe diplomatic sanctuary when aberrant abuses of civilians occur.
Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS 193, 196 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Weiss].
See RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (1994) ("Today's critique is that intervention, including
military intervention by outsiders, is legitimate and even necessary when a government severely
represses the human rights of its own people... "); ROBERT L. PHILLIPS & DUANE L. CADY,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: JUST WAR VS. PACIFISM 19-21 (1996); Gordon, supra note
67, at 554 (suggesting that the UN intervention in Somalia was in fact prompted by humanitar-
ian concerns, but that the United Nations was unwilling to state that as the basis for acting).
71. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 533 ("[T]he principles governing unilateral State inter-
vention in internal conflicts appear to be moving towards nonintervention."); see also Stephan
A. Wangsgard, Secession, Humanitarian Intervention, And Clear Objectives: When to Commit
United States Military Forces, 3 TUL.SA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 313, 314 (1996) ("The United
States must intervene only under multilateral auspices that abide by the principles of humani-
tarian intervention."); PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 19 (quoting a report of the Wilton
Park Conference on the United Nations in the new World Disorder) (Humanitarian intervention
"should be undertaken by the UN ... and/or by the regional organization to which the state
belongs, so as to secure international control and legitimacy."). See generally James A.R. Nafzi-
ger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power, 20 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 9 (1991) (discussing alternatives to unilateral humanitarian intervention).
72. Wyn Q. Bowen, The US National Interest and the Future of Military Intervention, in
MILITARY INTERVENTION: FROM GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
83, 85 (Andrew M. Dorman & Thomas G. Otte eds., 1995) [hereinafter US National Interest].
The U.S. government is responsible for protecting the lives and personal safety of
Americans, maintaining our political freedom and independence as a nation and
promoting the well-being and prosperity of our nation. No matter how powerful we
are as a nation, we cannot secure these basic goals unilaterally. Whether the problem
is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former So-
viet empire or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face demand
cooperative, multinational solutions. Therefore, the only responsible U.S. strategy is
one that seeks to ensure U.S. influence over and participation in collective decision-
making in a wide and growing range of circumstances.
THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND EN-
LARGEMENT 8 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
73. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
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addition, despite the liberalization of the rules of humanitarian intervention,
state sovereignty remains of paramount importance in international law.74
The inherent tension between the traditional respect for state sover-
eignty and recent inclinations to address humanitarian crises is illustrated
by recent international responses to traditionally internal or domestic cri-
ses. In the case of Somalia, the United States initially suggested it would
enter the country unilaterally to provide humanitarian assistance." This
U.S. involvement, however, was ratified expressly by the United Na-
tions.76 Such an intervention differed from the 1996 action against Iraq in
several ways. As an initial matter, the intervention in Somalia was not
explicitly military in the way air strikes are. While military force was an
authorized option in the Somalia affair, the goal of the actions was the
provision of humanitarian supplies to the civilian population." Further-
more, the crisis in Somalia was truly extraordinary and exceptional:
government had all but ceased to exist and the country was collapsing.8
And yet, even in responding to a humanitarian catastrophe in a nation in
chaos, the United Nations avoided justifying the intervention on strictly
humanitarian grounds for fear of the precedent that might be established. 9
Perhaps most importantly, the United Nations was involved directly in the
crisis and approved and authorized the U.S. action.
Similarly in Bosnia, the United Nations and the United States inter-
vened in a foreign nation for what were widely regarded as humanitarian
purposes. In this instance, the U.S. military intervention was authorized
by NATO and involved direct cooperation with the United Nations. s° As
was the case in Somalia, the intervention raised fewer questions of U.S.
self-interest because of multilateral involvement in the endeavor. Fur-
thermore, the intervention was classified primarily as a peace-keeping
mission necessary to enforce a cease-fire and not as an essentially hu-
manitarian action.81 Finally, while the intervention in Bosnia involved
74. See Otte, Conclusions & Reflections, supra note 65, at 197.
75. See Dean N. Reinhardt, The United States Military and United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 245, 265-66 (1996).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 265 ("[I]n Resolution 794 [the Security Council] authorize[d] a United States
led coalition to use 'all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations."').
78. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 553-54 ("Somalia presented an exception and unique
situation .... [There was an] almost total breakdown of governmental authority.").
79. See id. ("[T]he [Security] Council found that there was a 'threat' to the peace ....
Member States did not want this action to be interpreted as a precedent for future situations:').
80. See generally John M. Goshko, U.N. Answers Critics of Policing Effort in Bosnia,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1996, at A10; THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ENFORCEMENT
OF THE No-FLY ZONE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, H.R. Doc NO. 104-79, at 1 (May 24, 1995)
(104th Cong., 1st Sess.).
8 1. See THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 80.
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military forces, such forces were not employed for aggressive military
strikes.
With regard to the 1996 intervention in Iraq, if it is to be justified as a
humanitarian intervention, it must have been prompted primarily by hu-
81manitarian concerns. Serious human rights violations in fact were
perpetrated by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds and the United States
appropriately expressed moral outrage.83 However, while the plight of the
Kurds was tragic, it was not novel84 Kurdish groups had been warring for
years and the United States saw no reason to intervene. In addition, brutal
fighting continued after the initial cruise missile strikes, with involvement
by Turkey and possibly even Iraq, and the United States took no action.85
The inconsistency of U.S. responses to humanitarian crises in Iraqi Kurd-
istan suggests that the humanitarian justification was not the driving force
behind U.S. policy in Iraq. The fact that the State Department offered a
litany of non-humanitarian justifications for the intervention; ranging
from enforcement of UN resolutions to numerous national security con-
cerns, also calls the primacy of the humanitarian justification into
86question. While nations cannot feasibly respond to every humanitarian
crisis and necessarily must discriminate among situations amenable to
intervention, U.S. conduct in Iraq suggests that the choice to intervene
was not in fact based on humanitarian concerns.
Perhaps the clearest indicator that the United States was not prompted
by humanitarian motives was the nature of the military strikes themselves.
While the Kurds suffered and died in northern Iraq, the United States
launched missile strikes in the south. 87 The nature and the brevity of the
attacks seemed almost uniquely ill-suited to address the immediate hu-
manitarian crisis faced by the Kurds in the north. To accept at face value
the U.S. contention that it acted out of humanitarian empathy is to ignore
82. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("[Saddam Hussein] clearly has taken actions against
the Kurdish people, actions... that are criminal."); Briefing #141, supra note 9 ("The issue is
that... Kurdish civilians have been victimized by Saddam Hussein.").
83. See generally supra Part I (discussing the plight of the Iraqi Kurds).
84. In 1988, Saddam Hussein employed "chemical weapons as well as massive bombard-
ments" against the Kurds. CHALIAND, supra note 13, at 11. The suffering of the Kurds was
widely publicized in the West. See id.
85. Kurdish suffering at the hands of Saddam Hussein predated the 1996 intervention and
continued thereafter. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. See generally supra Part I.
86. In the aftermath of the intervention the State Department in fact began stressing non-
humanitarian motives as the primary basis for the action. See Briefing #146, supra note 49
("[T]he core of U.S. strategic interests are: to protect Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."); Briefing
#145, supra note 32 (avoiding a threat to Iraq's neighbors in the south "is, of course, the heart of
America's vital interests in that part of the world.").
87. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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political reality." The ambiguity surrounding the humanitarian justifica-
tion highlights the need for multilateral consensus to form the basis of
international efforts in defense of humanitarian interests.89
Even if humanitarian motives did prompt the United States to inter-
vene, the action nevertheless was not justified. As a multilateral effort the
intervention was illegitimate as there was no multilateral consensus. The
State Department appears to recognize the importance of multilateralism
in humanitarian military interventions. On numerous occasions it sought
to portray the September 1996 intervention as the product of an interna-
tional consensus regarding human rights violations in Iraq. 90 These
contentions were clearly refuted by the criticism and disagreement ex-
pressed by numerous nations which had participated in the Gulf War
coalition.91 Russia criticized the action and the failure to consult with the
UN Security Council, France refused to enforce the extension of the no-
fly zone and the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers denounced any
88. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 521 n.6 ("Unilateral interventions are generally to
achieve the national interests of the intervenor."). Because unilateral actions often reflect the
national interests of the intervenor, all unilateral military interventions are subject to the same
criticism as interventions specifically grounded in national security concerns. The same logic
applies to justifications based upon international law and international interests such as hu-
manitarian concerns. See also HAASS, supra note 70, at 69 ("Most thoughtful observers of U.S.
foreign policy have long since concluded that the 'national interest' concept unfortunately lends
itself more readily to being used by our leaders as political rhetoric for justifying their decisions
and gaining support rather than as an exact, well-defined criterion that enables them to deter-
mine what actions and decision to take."). See generally infra Part IV (discussing U.S. national
security claims).
On at least one occasion, the United States directly revealed the duplicity of its myriad jus-
tifications. See Briefing #146, supra note 49 ("I think Saddam Hussein has extended his reach in
the north [Kurdish territory] -- there's no question about that -- but militarily where it counts, he
continues to be bottled up by the United States and our allies where it counts.' (emphasis
added)).
89. See PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 14 ("[Tlhere will always be a suspicion re-
garding the motives of the intervener. Is the intervention self-serving?... Is there self-deception
or just plain deception?").
Unilateral intervention creates the largest risk of self-serving or pretextual humanitarian in-
tervention. Multilateral intervention minimizes the likelihood of such pretextual humanitarian
intervention. See infra text accompanying notes 101-104.
90. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("[I]t's very clear to us here in Washington this morn-
ing that the international coalition against Saddam Hussein is intact... [W]e are satisfied with
the consultations that we had with our allies leading up to the decision by the President to strike
back at Saddam Hussein."); id. ("We are convinced that this international coalition is intact and
will continue to work."); id. (discussing the extension of the no-fly zones, the State Department
contended that "[tjhis is an agreement put in place by the coalition partners .... I believe there
is allied unity and unanimity on that question this afternoon."); supra note 72 (outlining U.S.
policy regarding multilateralism).
91. See Mitchell, supra note 2.
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interference with the sovereignty of Iraq.92 The attack was carried out by
U.S. armed forces using U.S. equipment without aid or assistance by any• 93
other nation. The intervention simply was not a multilateral undertaking.
In addition, viewed as a unilateral action, the intervention was unjus-
tifiable because unilateral humanitarian intervention remains suspect
under international law.94 The State Department at times portrayed the
intervention as a unilateral action by the United States justified by hu-
manitarian concerns for the long-suffering Kurds.9s Looking to the
criticism by, and lack of consultation with, other nations, the portrayal of
the intervention as unilateral is clearly accurate; however, that this unilat-
eralism made the intervention unjustifiable under international law is
equally clear.
Absent consultation with other concerned or affected nations, or more
persuasive evidence that humanitarian motives truly prompted a given
military action, humanitarian concern is unacceptable under international
law as a justification for unilateral military intervention. Even legitimate
humanitarian concerns for repressed minorities should not serve to justify
unilateral military intervention in the sovereignty of a foreign nation un-
less and until all other avenues of response have been exhausted.
97
Humanitarian crises are all too frequent in the late twentieth century and,
if accepted without challenge as grounds for unilateral military interven-
tion, would give nations carte blanche to intervene at will in a myriad of
situations and locations. The frequency of such crises would allow nations
to pick and choose which crises to address.9 These choices would likely
correspond with the national interests of the intervening nation.99 Re-
gardless of the actual basis for action, a humanitarian pretext could
always be enunciated to justify any unilateral military intervention.
92. See Arab League Condemns US Attack, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, supra note 43;
Randal, supra note 39 (France refused to "participate in enforcement of the enlarged portion of
the zone.").
93. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing the demise of the Gulf War coa-
lition).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 102-105 (outlining the safeguards provided by re-
quiring that all humanitarian interventions begin with genuine multilateral consensus); see also
infra Part III (discussing the UN Charter's prohibition on unilateral intervention).
95. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("The justification for this is very clear. This man was
a criminal back in 1990-91 when he invaded Kuwait. He was a criminal when he tried to exter-
minate the Iraqi Kurds. Someone has to protect the Iraqi Kurds. In this case, the United States
has taken upon itself to act in our own interest to do so .... The fact is this was a unilateral U.S.
military action.").
96. See PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 14.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 (discussing changing the norm against uni-
lateral intervention only in the context of multilateralism).
98. Compare the continuing U.S. involvement in the oil-producing Middle East with its
lack of response to the genocide in Rwanda.
99. See PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 14.
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Looking beyond explicit U.S. reliance on humanitarian concerns, the
rhetoric of the United States following the intervention suggests yet an-
other explanation for the action against Iraq. Perhaps recognizing the
appeal and legitimacy of multilateralism and the difficulties inherent in
justifying unilateral humanitarian military intervention, the State Depart-
ment apparently attempted to split the difference by portraying the
intervention as a unilateral action undertaken in the interests of interna-
tional law and the international community.' °° This notion of implicit or
constructive multilateralism, suggesting that the goals of the intervention
served the interests of the broader international community even though
the action was planned and undertaken unilaterally, represents a poten-
tially dangerous blurring of the distinction between multilateral and
unilateral action as well as the line between international and domestic
interests.''
100. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("In this particular instance, because the credibility
of the United States and the international community was on the line, we felt it was important to
have a quick, decisive and forceful military response from the United States.").
In response to a question regarding the lack of involvement of other coalition members, Mr.
Burns responded:
Countries made their own decisions about what they wanted to do, and that I think is
just a basic fact about coalitions -- that there will be times when the coalition is ab-
solutely united on all the details, there will be times when perhaps there are some
disagreements; but what really matters is, is the coalition still focused on the major
goal? The goal is containing Saddam Hussein, protecting the Iraqi Kurds, making
sure that international agreements are not being overridden.
Id. Referring to the intervention as a "detail:' the State Department suggested that it acted in the
interests of the international community with the implicit sanction of that community. See id.
("Saddam Hussein... has challenged the international community, and the United States has
stood up and said, 'No, Saddam Hussein is not going to get away with these actions."'); Briefing
#141, supra note 9 ("It's obvious that the United States is acting within an international context
here... ); see also infra Epilogue (arguing that in 1997 the United States was still suggesting
that its actions were in the world's interests).
Indeed, all of the U.S. justifications for the intervention based on UN Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq can be seen as attempts to conflate national interest with international
relevance and multilateralism. If the United States merely acted to enforce UN resolutions then
it is merely enforcing the multilateral international will expressed by the Security Council. See
generally infra Part III (discussing U.S. claims that it acted to enforce UN resolutions).
101. Multilateral intervention is as much process as result. The nature of the intervention
itself, not simply the nature of the interests involved, serve to distinguish multilateralism from
unilateralism. As Robert Mandel states:
[C]onsiderable conceptual blurring surrounding key national security distinctions...
has occurred in the post-Cold War world... [making] it harder to divide domestic
and foreign policy, or military and economic policy .... The impact of these blurring
distinctions on security policy seems to be generally pernicious, leading either to
paralyzed cautious and conservative policy or to chaotic rash and reckless policy.
ROBERT MANDEL, THE CHANGING FACE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
12-13 (1994). Confusing national interest with international, multilateral interests can result in
reckless unilateral action in violation of international law.
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The logic suggested by this implicit multilateralism argument is trou-
bling. Simply declaring an issue to be international in scope cannot
suffice to justify military intervention. Accepting such an argument would
allow nations to declare that an issue has international significance and,
based upon this international relevance, presume multilateral interest in,
and thus sanction for, intervention. Instead, a true international consensus
should be required to define an issue as international in scope.'02 Only
then would true multilateralism exist and only then would intervention be
appropriate.
It follows that only an international, multilateral perspective can en-
sure that humanitarian justifications for intervention in traditionally
domestic concerns of nations are more than mere self-serving pretexts of
interested nations. 10 3 In a strict moral sense, repression and suffering in
any setting deserve attention regardless of their international impact and
influence; however, this instinct to redress suffering must be balanced
against the dangers of self-interested military action and violations of na-
tional sovereignty. When repression and suffering are used to justify the
violation of a nation's sovereignty, the true motives of the intervening
party must be exposed to avoid undue interference with state sovereignty.
If the international community can be convinced that the situation war-
rants intervention, it is much less likely that ulterior motives of individual
states are being served. °4 Respect for state sovereignty and the need for
intervention to address serious humanitarian crises can only be reconciled
by a requirement for multilateral consensus.
Multilateralism also serves to limit intervention to those crises which
are sufficiently grave and legitimately international in scope. Consensus
will not emerge absent compelling circumstances and a sense among the
community of nations that the situation in question impacts substantially
upon the international community. This preserves the core of state sover-
eignty by assuring that internal or domestic situations and circumstances
which are not of genuine international concern will remain within the
102. See Wangsgard, supra note 71, at 322-23 (stating that humanitarian intervention is
only appropriate when needed to confront a threat to "international order and security.").
103. One commentator has suggested that:
[A] healthy skepticism with regard to the humanitarian motivations of state govern-
ments is not at all misguided, internationally sanctioned military interventions on
.humanitarian grounds have clearly become an issue in an international system which
is more integrated than ever before .... International support for a contemplated
military intervention is clearly needed; it adds legitimacy to [the) action ....
Otte, Conclusions & Reflections, supra note 65, at 197, 201. See Nafziger, supra note 71, at 26
("[M]ultilateral action provides a more reliable consensus of support, checks abuses, and better
ensures that intervention is warranted."); Wangsgard, supra note 71, at 322-23.
104. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 199 (arguing that the United Nations serves to legitimize
intervention); PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 19; Wangsgard, supra note 71, at 323.
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exclusive control of sovereign nations. The nations which constitute the
international community will, in seeking or failing to seek international
consensus on humanitarian issues, decide in the most practical sense
which issues warrant an international response.105
This approach to humanitarian intervention is conservative and would
limit the international community's ability to respond to legitimate crises.
This is a difficult but necessary trade-off. Respect for state sovereignty
and the desire to avoid self-interested action by nations demands such a
conservative position. The potential harshness of this view can be miti-
gated by the increasing influence and effectiveness of non-governmental
organizations in responding to international crises. The motives of NGOs
are generally less suspect than those of nations and these organizations
can respond to situations that the community of nations refrains from ad-
dressing.
The situation in Iraq in August and September of 1996 presented the
world with a serious crisis as an ethnic minority was threatened militarily.
The humanitarian crisis faced by the Kurdish people was significant.
10 6
The response of the international community is instructive here. While
disapproving of Iraq's actions, most nations viewed the U.S. response as
107disproportionate and inappropriate. Had they been consulted at greater
length, these nations may have supported less extreme efforts to address
the situation.0 The international community clearly viewed the situation
differently than the United States. This lends credibility to the suggestion
that perhaps the United States had interests at stake other than humani-
tarian concerns. Thus, U.S. attempts to justify the intervention in
humanitarian terms exemplify the problems associated with intervention
absent multilateral consensus.' t 9 Nations could act in their own interests
while claiming to be responding to an international problem. A truly in-
ternational problem cannot be declared as such unilaterally; the States
which make up that community must perceive the situation as warranting
a response." 0 There are numerous humanitarian crises in the world whose
105. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 199-200.
106. See generally supra Part I (detailing the experiences of the Iraqi Kurds prior and sub-
sequent to the U.S. intervention in 1996).
107. See Whitney, supra note 6.
108. Intervention should be proportional to the threat and used only when it is likely to
succeed where other policy options would fail. See HAASS, supra note 70, at 70. Many nations
complained that greater consultation should have proceeded the military action. See Whitney,
supra note 6.
109. See Briefing #140, supra note 6.
110. This suggests a fundamental basis for the nearly universal preference in international
law for multilateral intervention; intervention undertaken on behalf of the international commu-
nity surely must have the support of the intended beneficiaries. The domestic analogue of this is
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severity matches that of the Kurdish tragedy in Iraq and an exception to a
requirement of multilateralism in responding to these situations could
quickly become the rule.
The U.S. intervention in Iraq ignored the models for multilateral in-
tervention provided by the Gulf War. The prosecution of the Gulf War and
the preceding military coordination and build-up serve as a model for
multilateral international efforts under the auspices of the United Nations,
while the subsequent creation and enforcement of the no-fly zones in
northern and southern Iraq exemplify the type of multilateral action by a
coalition of States to address a humanitarian crisis which is gaining ac-
ceptance under international law."' The entirely unilateral extension of
the no-fly zones and the military intervention in Iraq by the United States
in September 1996 stand in stark contrast to these multilateral, consensus-
based actions. The international impact and relevance of Iraq's aggression
cannot obscure the fact that the U.S. intervention was wholly unilateral
and in violation of international legal norms.
III. HIDING BEHIND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE CHARTER,
RESOLUTIONS AND No-FLY ZONES".2
This Part argues that the United States neglected to consult with the
United Nations prior to intervening militarily in Iraq and failed to act in
accordance with the requirements of the UN Charter, Security Council
Resolutions, or the rules relating to the no-fly zones. The UN Charter
does not justify the military action undertaken, and the U.S. intervention
was not a valid enforcement of Resolution 688 or 687 or the no-fly zone
mechanism."' In addition, the United States failed to adequately consult
with the United Nations and its Member States under whose auspices any
enforcement of UN resolutions must take place.
the national security justification. See generally infra Part IV (analyzing national security justi-
fications).
111. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULES OF LAW
351 (1992).
112. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it is undisputed that the United
States recognizes the legitimacy and relevance of the United Nations in the international arena.
113. The no-fly zones were not established under the auspices of the United Nations. See
Corrections, supra note 24. This note, however, will discuss the establishment 'of the no-fly
zones as the United States claims the imprimatur of the United Nations for the no-fl, zones. The
State Department contended that the no-fly zones were "set up pursuant to a UN Security Coun-
cil resolution.' Briefing #141, supra note 9. See also Duffy, supra note 40, at 38-39 ("[T]he
troop movement involved no violation of the no-fly zone designated in northern Iraq and no




In his "Agenda for Peace," UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros
Ghali re-affirmed state sovereignty as a cornerstone of international
law.' 4 As discussed in Part II, international law continues to prohibit
military intervention as a means of resolving domestic crises and the UN
Charter embodies these principles. Sections 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN
Charter forbid intervention by one nation in internal matters of other na-
tions except when required for self-defense." 5  While this general
prohibition is being moderated as humanitarian disasters exert ever
greater pressure for responses from the international community, such
liberalization applies only to multilateral humanitarian efforts and does
not constitute a license for unilateral endeavors. Had the Gulf War coa-
lition remained intact, its multilateral nature might have provided a basis
for implying UN approval; despite U.S. protestations to the contrary, the
fragmentation and dissolution of the coalition is all too apparent.'
The United States made no attempt to consult with the United Na-
tions or bring its concerns regarding Iraqi actions to the Security
Council." 8 While purporting to rely on UN resolutions 678 and 688,
114. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 201 (discussing Boutros Boutros Ghali's Agenda For
Peace).
115. Art.2(4) of United Nations Charter reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
UN CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. Art. 2(7) reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement meas-
ures under Chapter VII.
Id. at art. 2, para. 7. Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to respond to threats to
peace. Art. 51 of Ch. 7 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
Id. at art. 51. It also embodies a conservative understanding of national security and self-
defense. See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, The Law, And The National Defense, 126
MIL. L. REV. 89 (1989) (discussing the view of self-defense embodied in UN Charter).
116. See generally supra Part II.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
118. See Johnstone, supra note 31, at 41 (discussing the 1993 military intervention in Iraq
and concluding that some of the "most vocal objections to the January 1993 strikes concerned
... the lack of consultation among Council members and coalition partners"). Thus, the United
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which were the product of unprecedented international cooperation, the
United States failed to significantly consult with the United Nations as an
organization or with its individual Member States."9 Russia was particu-
larly critical of the U.S. failure to bring the issue before the United
Nations."'
Nor was the crisis unforeseeable enough to justify unilateral action by
the United States without consulting the United Nations.' While hu-
manitarian crises may often be unforeseeable and require promlpt and
rapid responses, the crisis in question was entirely predictable. The
United States had been aware of the rift between the PUK and KDP for
years and had helped broker several cease fires between the two fac-
tions. "'23 In addition, a report to Congress from 1991 predicted that a clash
was likely between the PUK and KDP.114 Given the history of this con-
flict, it was reasonable to consider the possibility that Baghdad could
become involved. The United States had ample opportunity to bring the
issues posed by this crisis before the United Nations for consideration of
appropriate responses. 25 Possibly, a multilateral effort could have been
States failed to learn from past mistakes as its allies and UN colleagues had argued in the past
for greater multilateralism and consultation when military intervention is considered. Unless the
United States was responding to an armed attack as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
enforcement issues should have been submitted to the Security Council.
After the fact, Great Britain introduced a resolution in the Security Council condemning
Iraqi actions and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kurdish areas, which was op-
posed by Russia, China and France. See Reid, supra note 55. The resolution was not approved.
See Briefing # 146, supra note 49. See generally infra Part V (discussing the disrespect the U.S.
actions indicates for international law).
119. See generally Briefing #140, supra note 6; Briefing #141, supra note 9. The U.S.
failure to consult with the Security Council stands in stark contrast to its conduct and rhetoric in
a more recent dispute with Iraq. See supra note 56 (discussing recent Iraqi defiance and the U.S.
reaction). Even more recent rhetoric by the United States suggests that this new approach to
international law and the United Nations was short-lived. See infra Epilogue.
120. See Reid, supra note 55 ("[T]he Russian Mission to the United Nations criticized the
United States for the attacks in Iraq and for extending the 'no fly' zones over northern and
southern Iraq without consulting the [security] council.").
121. See Briefing #149, supra note 39 ("Saddam... started the aggression.., without any
warning to the United States .... There was a premium for a quick response by the United
States... ).
122. See Mitchell, supra note 2 ("White House officials said the Administration began re-
ceiving intelligence information two weeks ago about possible Iraqi intervention in fighting
between two Kurdish factions.").
123. See Briefing #138, supra note 35 (discussing United States efforts to broker a cease-
fire among Kurdish groups); Briefing #145, supra note 32 (There are "long held bitter divisions
in the Kurdish community."); Briefing #140, supra note 6 (The KDP and the PUK "have lost a
major opportunity over the last five years to promote the interests of the Kurdish people.").
124. See STAFF REPORT ON KURDISTAN, supra note 15.
125. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("We engaged in an intensive two days of diplomacy,
consultations with our European allies, with partners in the area, in the Middle East, about what
should be done... :'). Thus the United States appeared to seek a multilateral approach initially.
When support was found lacking, the decision was apparently made to act unilaterally. This
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cobbled together given sufficient time for consideration of the issues and
possible responses. If multilateral support was not forthcoming, perhaps
this should have suggested to the United States that military intervention
• • 126
was inappropnate.
Contrary to assertions by the State Department, the U.S. intervention
was not a valid enforcement action under UN Resolution 688. 27 The
Resolution, adopted on April 5, 1991 in response to Iraqi repression of the
Kurds, contains no enforcement mechanism and does not authorize mul-
tilateral or unilateral action against Iraq.12 8 Resolution 688 condemns Iraqi
repression of the Kurdish population and demands the cessation of such
activities; however, it does not directly authorize military intervention and
this suggests that the United Nations is responsible for its implementation
and enforcement.' In addition, the Resolution clearly relates to inde-
pendent Iraqi persecution of the Kurdish minority and not to Iraqi
involvement at the request of a Kurdish nationalist group.130 Resolution
688 can be viewed as a recognition by the United Nations of a right under
customary international law (in this case under UN auspices) to take mul-
tilateral action when required to address grave humanitarian crises.13' This
suggests that the United States had sufficient time to consult with the United Nations, but simply
did not like the responses it received from its allies and UN Member-States.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
127. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 states in part:
The Security Council, Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas...;
Demands that Iraq ... immediately end this repression•...;
Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to
these humanitarian relief efforts;
Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). "The United States has clear authority under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 688." Briefing #140, supra note 6.
128. The State Department acknowledged this lack of an enforcement mechanism in re-
sponse to a question by arguing that Resolutions "678 and 688 together... form the basis for
the action." Briefing #141, supra note 9.
129. See S.C. Res. 688, supra note 127.
130. See Parsons & Rowley, supra note 5 ("[Tlhe fact that Iraqi troops were, in effect, in-
vited undercuts the American justification for intervening to punish Hussein's forces because
the goal of the U.S. and its allies is to protect the Kurds from being oppressed by Iraq, not by
each other."); Steven Lee Myers, U.N. Halts Deal for Iraq Oil Sales As U.S. Pledges Action on
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at AI [hereinafter Myers, U.N. Halts Deal] ("'There's some
distinction here between invading into Kuwait and engaging in an internal dispute here with the
Kurds,' Mr. Panetta said."). This argument applies equally as strongly to the intention of UN
Resolution 688, the focus of which is on Iraqi oppression, not Kurdish civil strife.
131. At least one commentator has taken such as position:
The argument for a right under customary law to enforce the no-fly zone rests on the
evolving and controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The doctrine holds
that such nonconsensual intervention is legal in cases of extreme humanitarian need,
Winter 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
argument, relying on Resolution 688 to justify military intervention under
certain conditions, is questionable under the best of circumstances, but in
this instance the fact that the United Nations expressly declined to
authorize military enforcement of Resolution 688 makes such an argu-
ment untenable."'
In addition, the United States failed to consult with the United Na-
tions regarding enforcement of Resolution 688. As the implementing
body, the United Nations was ultimately responsible for enforcement of
Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 688. As such, the
United States, absent an express delegation of enforcement power from
the United Nations, was obliged to seek authorization from the Security
Council prior to any enforcement action." Given the absence of any en-
forcement provisions in Resolution 688, the U.S. failure to consult with
the United Nations was counter to the clear mandate of that Resolution.
Unilateral enforcement, without even consulting the United Nations, was
inappropriate and contrary to the language and intention of the Resolu-
tion.
U.S. reliance on Resolutions 67834 and 68735 was also misplaced.
Resolution 687 established the cease-fire that officially ended the Gulf
War hostilities. It explicitly incorporates the authorization of the use of
especially when the humanitarian crisis threatens international peace and security.
Resolution 688, even if not enforceable in itself, could be used to support the cus-
tomary law claim.
Johnstone, supra note 31, at 38 (addressing the 1993 military intervention).
132. See id. at 38-39 ("The weakness of this argument is that it treats as insignificant the
fact that the Council specifically refrained from authorizing military action on behalf of the
Kurds and Shiites") (addressing the 1993 military intervention).
133. See supra note 56 (discussing recent Iraqi defiance and the U.S. reaction). The U.S.
eagerness in 1997 to consult with the United Nations regarding enforcement of Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq suggests a belated recognition that enforcement is properly channeled
through the United Nations.
134. Resolution 678, adopted Nov. 29, 1990, states in part:
"The Security Council. ... Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Govern-
ment of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution
660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security in the area."
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
135. Resolution 687, adopted Apr. 3, 1991, states in part:
The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990)...;
Affirms all ... resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve
the goals of this resolution...;
Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international bound-
ary ....
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). The requirements of the resolution are concerned
solely with territorial integrity, settlement of claims and monitoring of Iraqi arms. No reference
is made to the protection of the Kurdish population or human rights.
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force found in Resolution 678, which permitted the coalition to "use allS 136
necessary means" to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. Any such incorpora-
tion, however, retains the context given in Resolution 660: the initial UN
Resolution addressing and condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.'
Resolution 660 was concerned solely with restoring the sovereignty of
Kuwait and does not mention the Kurds at all. There is nothing in Reso-
lution 687 to justify applying the authorization for the use of force
contained in Resolution 678 to Iraq's repression of the Kurds within its
boundaries. The U S suggestion that Resolution 687 authorizes unilateral
enforcement by military intervention of any preceding or subsequent
Resolution regarding Irac is not supported by its text, logic, or the history
of UN action in this area.
Use of force appears to be justified under Resolution 678 as a means
only of restoring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kuwait.
139
Among the many justifications offered for its intervention, the United
States failed to mention the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ku-
wait. Nor would there have been any justification for such a claim.
Baghdad's intentions, while nefarious, were clearly not aimed at the sov-
ereignty of Kuwait. Thus, the U.S. intervention was not justified under
Resolution 687 even if the authorization for use of force contained in
Resolution 678 is implicitly extended to the terms of Resolution 687.140
The specific terms of Resolution 687 demand only that "Iraq ... respect
the inviolability of the international boundary" between the nations and
makes no reference to the Kurds, internal conflicts or other tangential
136. Id.
137. Resolution 660, adopted Aug. 2, 1990, states in part:
The Security Council,
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of
Iraq... ;
Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). The Resolution is concerned solely with the inva-
sion of Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
138. See Johnstone, supra note 31, at 39 (discussing "[tihe legal argument for the military
action... that Resolution 678 was suspended by Resolution 687 only insofar as Iraq remained
in compliance with the terms of the cease-fire:'). The author goes on to suggest that "the silence
in the [Security] Council after the [1993] military strikes suggest an attitude of passive acquies-
cence" justifying claims that the actions were in fact justifiable enforcement of UN Security
Council Resolutions. Id. at 40-41. Even if this argument was valid in regard to the 1993 military
intervention in Iraq, the widespread condemnation of the 1996 intervention, criticism of which
was expressly vociferous from Russia, a Security Council permanent member, indicates that the
same "passive acquiescence" argument fails as regards the September 1996 military action by
the United States.
139. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 134; S.C. Res 660, supra note 137.
140. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 134; S.C. Res. 687, supra note 135.
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issues related to the regime of Saddam Hussein.14' Moreover, a justifica-
tion of this sort could create a dangerous precedent as it would allow for
unilateral military intervention by any UN Member State whenever Iraq
failed to precisely comply with the requirements of the Gulf War cease-
fire. 142
U.S. reliance upon the violation of the no-fly zones by Iraqi ground
troops to justify the military intervention was similarly unwarranted. The
zones were set up pursuant to the consensus of the Gulf War coalition.
14
1
Such a multilateral effort did not anticipate unilateral enforcement by way
of military strikes or unilateral extension of the zones.'" In addition, the
no-fly zones, as is suggested by the term, have generally been understood
to prohibit flights only, making them inapplicable to the movement of
ground troops. Any implicit UN acceptance of the validity of the zones
was certainly contingent upon their multilateral nature, and, as a result,
UN consent cannot justify unilateral U.S. enforcement of the zones, un-
supported by the members of the coalition.'46
The specific legal and factual bases of the UN-based justifications for
the intervention offered by the U.S. were never clearly enunciated by the
United States. Looking to the express language of the resolutions, how-
ever, it is clear that under any formulation adopted by the United States,
they did not contemplate or authorize unilateral military action in re-
sponse to internal conflict in Iraq. No international boundary was violated
by Iraq's actions in August and September and no legitimate threat to in-
ternational peace and security was evident. Iraq's aggression was not in
direct violation of the conditions imposed on Iraq by the Gulf War cease-
fire or even of the no-fly zones. U.S. reliance on past UN actions and
statements regarding Iraq provided a convenient pretext for its unilateral
intervention. They do not, however, stand up under careful scrutiny as
legal grounds for unilateral military action or enforcement.
141. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 135.
142. See Johnstone, supra note 31, at 40 ("[This] position would leave to any state coop-
erating with Kuwait the right to take unilateral military action based on a particular violation of
the cease-fire conditions, even though not all instances of noncompliance represent a threat to
international peace and security.").
143. See Corrections, supra note 24.
144. The United States acknowledged this in stating that "in point of fact, that 'no-fly'
zone is a matter between the United States, France, the U.K., and those are the countries that are
enforcing the 'no-fly' zone that have set it up." Briefing #141, supra note 9.
145. See Duffy, supra note 40, at 38-39.
146. See Johnstone, supra note 31, at 38.
147. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 134; S.C. Res. 687, supra note 135.
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY JUSTIFICATIONS: TRUMPING
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
"[N]ational interest" has become so elastic and ambiguous a con-
cept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is highly
problematical and controversial. Most thoughtful observers of
U.S. foreign policy have long since concluded that the "national
interest" concept unfortunately lends itself more readily to being
used by our leaders as political rhetoric for justifying their deci-
sions and gaining support rather than as an exact, well-defined
criterion that enables them to determine what actions and deci-
sions to take.'48
The State Department's. reliance on U.S. national security as a justifi-
cation for ignoring international law and intervening militarily in Iraq
reflects an understanding of national security which is at odds with inter-
national law and custom.'49 National security issues and international
legal principles necessarily conflict and overlap and the inherent tension
between the two is especially evident in U.S. statements regarding the
1996 intervention in Iraq. 5° The national security of the United States as
enunciated by President Clinton encompasses a range of issues which, if
accepted at face value and understood as grounds for military action,
serve to override any limitations international law places on a nation's
right to act unilaterally on the world stage."' Even if such a view of na-
tional security was legitimate under international law, the specific national
security justifications offered in support of the September 1996 interven-
tion are unconvincing on their own terms.
152
The traditional definition of national security is predicated on self-
defense, as is evidenced by the UN Charter's prohibition on military
intervention except in response to armed attack; however, this narrow
view is giving way to a broader definition.'53 Without reference to the
148. HAASS, supra note 70, at 69.
149. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("[W]e have the compelling, vital national interests
of the United States in our favor.").
150. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 115 (indicating that terrorism is a national security issue
which clearly impacts on international law).
151. In January 1993, President Clinton appears to have recognized this to a certain extent
in stating, "there is no clear division today between what is foreign and what is domestic." US
National Interest, supra note 72, at 85.
152. See Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and Clinton Defense Policy,
in CLINTON AND POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE 87, 90 (Stephen J. Cimbala ed., 1996) ("No im-
portant American security interests in any traditional sense are involved in any possible outcome
in Kurdistan ....").
153. See AMOS A. JORDAN & WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY AND PROCESS 1 (1981); Sofaer, supra note 115, at 96 (seeking to expand the definition
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constraints of international law and ignoring common understandings of
self-defense, the Clinton administration defines U.S. national security to
include humanitarian, economic, political, and military concerns. 5 4 This
expansion of the concept of national security has blurred substantially the
line between national interests and international concerns.' While na-
tional self-defense arguably should be and has been expanded to include
acts short of armed aggression, accepting an ever-expanding definition of
national security, with its concomitant ever-expanding justification for
unilateral military action, goes too far. 16
In the post-Cold War world, a broad array of issues do impact on U.S.
national security; however, the question remains which threats to national
security warrant a military response. 5 7 In conjunction with a broad view
of national security, the United States has outlined an expansive subset of
interests which "can merit the use of our armed forces" and which include
interests that effect "the character of the world in which we live."158
of self-defense to allow military responses to terrorist threats); supra note 115 (quoting U.N.
Charter, art. 2, 14 and art. 51); supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
154. This follows a pattern recognized by some scholars:
[I]n the current era the perceived sources of danger to national security have... sig-
nificantly widened. There is new emphasis on subnational and transnational threats,
such as the security challenges from subnational ethnic strife and transnational ter-
rorism [and] ... nonmilitary threats, such as that posed by Japan to the economic
security of the United States and Western Europe.
MANDEL, supra note 101, at 29. See HAASS, supra note 70, at 69 (defining national security
interests to include "strategic, political, moral, humanitarian, economic [and] environmental"
threats); NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 72.
155. See MANDEL, supra note 101, at 12-13
156. The very fact that the use of military intervention to respond to terrorism remains
somewhat controversial underlines how the Clinton administration's definition of national secu-
rity pushes the envelope of justifiable military action in defense of national security. See
generally Sofaer, supra note 115.
157. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 199 ("Intervention is not a single phenomenon. It is gen-
erally understood as constituting the spectrum of possible actions intended to alter internal
affairs elsewhere."); Otte, Conclusions & Reflections, supra note 65, at 201 ("[M]ilitary inter-
vention is a highly inflexible instrument.").
158. Three basic categories have been recognized as meriting a military response:
The first involves America's vital interests, i.e., interests which are of broad, over-
riding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity-the
defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being ....
The second category includes cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests
are threatened. That is, the interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but
they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in
which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S.
interests ....
The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Here, our decisions fo-
cus on the resource we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military
rather than on the combat power of military force.
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Relying on this expansive array of national security concerns to justify
unilateral military intervention in foreign nations would eviscerate inter-
national law. Military intervention would become a standard diplomatic
tool. Nations must not be able to justify a greater role for military inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of other States simply by re-defining and
expanding the notion of national security.'" International law places con-
straints on the military actions of nations and compliance with these
constraints is crucial. Merely invoking "national security" cannot serve to
excuse a nation from the strictures of its international legal obligations.
The specific national security concerns raised by the United States to
justify the intervention remain unconvincing regardless of the validity of
its overall national security strategy. The United States expressed con-
cerns regarding the stability of petroleum reserves in the Middle East in
justifying its military intervention, suggesting that Iraq sought to sabotage
oil production.6 This economic rationale is more sound in principle than
others proffered, as the flow of foreign oil is crucial for the well-being of
the United States. However, whatever the legitimacy of this national secu-
rity argument in theory, there is little factual basis for it. Iraq's military
actions were undertaken at the request of the KDP for the purpose of
subjugating the followers of the PUK. 16 1 While the undertaking was
wrong and morally repugnant, it did not place the flow of oil to the
United States in any danger. Iraq is situated in an oil-producing region of
the world, but this cannot serve to paint all of its decisions and actions as
inextricably linked to the flow of oil to the West. The petroleum scenario
is precisely the kind of pretext for military action that poses a real threat• 162
to national sovereignty.
The claim that humanitarian concerns prompted the U.S. action is the
most compelling of the various national security claims presented; how-
ever, except under the most liberal of definitions, it is difficult to view this
as a true national security interest of the United States that justifies unilat-
eral military intervention.6 6 Repression of the Kurds has gone on for
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 72, at 12.
159. If all actions by nations are recast as domestic or national security undertakings, then
respect for state sovereignty over domestic concerns would make international law obsolete.
160. See Briefing #148, supra note 39 ("We have vital national interests in the Middle
East, in the secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and we're going to act to defend our own
national interests.").
161. See Parsons & Rowley, supra note 5.
162. See PHILLIPS & CADY, supra note 70, at 14. In fact the intervention succeeded in de-
laying the entry of Iraqi oil into the petroleum market as a UN food-for-oil-deal with Iraq was
scuttled after the intervention. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
163. See generally supra Part II for a fuller discussion of the humanitarian justification for
the intervention; Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("Someone has to protect the Iraqi Kurds. In this
case, the United States has taken upon itself to act in our [sic] own interest to do so.").
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years and has continued after the intervention, and yet the United States
has been content to ignore it.' 64 In addition, humanitarian crises continue
throughout the world, and the United States has declined to intervene.
Again, the fact that such a myriad of justifications was offered suggests
that the humanitarian claim may be pretextual."6 '
The protection of Arab allies from Iraq also appears to be a national/ . •. .. 166
security concern as defined by the Clinton administration. This justifi-
cation would likewise make a mockery of international legal constraints
on military intervention. As mentioned above, such a vicarious or implic-
itly multilateral justification for force allows a single nation to violate the
sovereignty of a foreign nation at will. Since military intervention under-
taken to protect nations other than the intervenor by definition implicates
international law and the rights of sovereign nations, such interventions
must be undertaken in compliance with international law and after con-
sultation with the nations of the world.' Iraq's actions were aimed at the
Kurds. 16 Neighboring countries that the United States sought to protect
never felt threatened.16 In fact, the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers,
representing the countries the United States viewed as threatened by Sad-
dam Hussein's actions, denounced foreign interference in Iraq."' There is
no foundation for the U.S. claim that it acted to forestall a threat to Iraq's
Arab neighbors.
The most egregious expansion of national security is represented by
the claim that "maintain[ing] a sense of peace and stability in northern
164. See generally infra Part I.
165. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 (listing U.S. justifications for the intervention).
166. See Briefing #146, supra note 49 ("[T]he core of U.S. strategic interests are: to pro-
tect Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."); Briefing #141, supra note 9 ("[One of the reasons [for the
intervention is] ... to remove some of his military capability so that he doesn't pose as great a
threat to his neighbors').
The State Department's argument that the intervention was justified by the U.S. need to
protect Iraq's neighbors from aggression is another attempt to define U.S. interests as coexten-
sive with the interests of the international community as a whole. The near absence of support
for the intervention from allies and countries neighboring Iraq thus severely undermines any
such justification for the U.S. actions. If the very nations whose sovereignty the United States
sought to protect, condemn the intervention, it is difficult to view that intervention as an expres-
sion of any general international will to action. Again, multilateralism is the only assurance that
intervention to remedy an international problem truly addresses a situation deemed important,
relevant and international in scope by the nations of the world. See generally supra Part II.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
168. See supra text accompanying note 5.
169. See Briefing #141, supra note 9 ("Have we picked up a particular signal that Saddam
Hussein is marching off in a direction to cross Iraq's international borders? I can't confirm
that'"). In fact the United States was concerned generally with the threat Iraq posed to regional
stability and this concern was unrelated to the events of August and September of 1996. See id.
("The bottom-line answer.., is Saddam is a standing threat to his neighbors."); Briefing #147,
supra note 39 (demanding that Iraq "cease to be a threat regionally").
170. See Arab League Condemns US Attack, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, supra note 43.
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Iraq" is a national security interest of the United States.17' This claimed
national security interest threatens to obliterate entirely the distinction
between international issues and domestic matters. If national security is
defined this broadly and serves as a valid basis for unilateral military ac-
tion throughout the world, then virtually any military intervention by the
United States anywhere in the world could be justified under international
law. 72 The Clinton administration expressly has recognized a right to the
unilateral use of force in defense of national security interests.7  Coupled
with a definition of national security that incorporates the peace and sta-
bility of foreign nations and regions, this policy on the proper use of force
would permit intervention at will in the name of any vague or tangential
national security interest, ignoring the strictures of international law and
custom. In addition, the U.S. military intervention did not in fact create or
restore peace and stability in northern Iraq.
74
Claims of national interest cannot be used automatically to shield
from scrutiny actions which would otherwise be unacceptable under in-
ternational law. The breadth of issues and circumstances covered by the
Clinton administration's definition of national security is awesome. In
combination with a willingness to back up these interests with military
force, national security would render international law wholly irrelevant
to the United States in virtually all matters of international significance.
Utilized this way, the Clinton administration's domestic policy conflicts
directly with the international agreements and obligations of the United
States.
V. THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARROGANCE,
IGNORANCE, AND AMBIVALENCE
Under generally accepted notions of international law, the U.S. mili-
tary action against Iraq was unjustified and likely unjustifiable. The
missile strikes were militarily ineffective against Saddam Hussein and
politically damaging only to the United States itself. In the end, after be-
ing criticized roundly for its actions, the United States appeared to simply
171. See Briefing #140, supra note 6
172. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 72; Les Aspin, Chal-
lenges to Value-Based Military Intervention, Keynote Address at the Managing Chaos
Conference (Nov. 30 1994), in U.S. INST. OF PEACE, KEYNOTE ADDRESSES FROM THE
MANAGING CHAOS CONFERENCE 1 (Feb. 1995). Both documents define national interests
broadly and neither document contains a single reference to international law in their discus-
sions of when the United States may intervene militarily abroad.
173. See supra text accompanying note 158.
174. See generally supra Part I.
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walk away from the continuing difficulties in northern Iraq.17 The United
States felt little obligation either to seek international support prior to the
intervention or to offer a sound legal justification for its conduct after the
fact. Instead, the Clinton administration was willing and able to take uni-
lateral military action against Iraq. 76 This may indicate that international
law is practically ineffective insofar as it seeks to proscribe unilateral in-
tervention in sovereign nations;177 however, the international outrage
which followed the intervention demonstrates that the strictures of inter-
national law are not wholly devoid of meaning. It is also interesting to
note the significant, if less than convincing, efforts that the United States
made after the fact to justify the intervention in terms of international law
and national security as well as its dramatically different approach to Iraq
in a recent weapons inspection crisis. In the end, the intervention in Iraq
failed, and it is perhaps best understood in that context: as a U.S. foreign
policy blunder.
International law and custom may have succeeded in creating an envi-
ronment in which even those countries that flout its precepts feel obliged
to seek legitimacy through them. In its initial explanations for the inter-
vention, the United States proclaimed that the Gulf War coalition
remained intact and served as the basis for the intervention.7 7 Thus, the
United States sought to cloak the action in the mantle of multilateralism,
seemingly recognizing that multilateral intervention in the affairs of a
sovereign nation is more defensible than unilateral action. 79 This suggests
that the United States did have some concern for international opinion and
hoped to be seen as acting legitimately and lawfully. The cracks in the
coalition were too obvious to ignore, however, and soon a myriad of justi-
fications for the actions was offered. ° The sheer breadth of the defenses
again is indicative of a real desire and felt need by the United States to be
175. See generally supra Part I.
176. See Briefing #147, supra note 39 ("Any further action that the United States takes, if
we need to protect our interests, we'll take it unilaterally."). See generally NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY, supra note 72.
177. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 195.
178. See Briefing #140, supra note 6.
179. See Shahin P. Malik & Andrew M. Dorman, United Nations and Military Interven-
tion: A Study in the Politics of Contradiction, in MILITARY INTERVENTION: FROM GUNBOAT
DIPLOMACY TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 161, 165 (Andrew M. Dorman & Thomas G.
Otte eds., 1995) ("[T]he end of the Cold War has seen an upsurge in humanitarian intervention
and concern for human rights matched to a continuing Great Power desire to have UN support
to justify their actions to their own population."). See generally supra Part II.
180. See Briefing #140, supra note 6.
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seen as acting appropriately and legally.' The United States ignored
international law, but refused to admit as much.
82
Efforts by the United States to justify the intervention under interna-
tional law are susceptible to further interpretation. Far from indicating
underlying respect for international law or recognition of its importance,
the feebleness of the multi-faceted and inconsistent rationales offered to
justify the intervention may signify a fundamental and deep-rooted disre-
spect of, and disregard for, international law by the United States. Its
belated and unpersuasive efforts to justify the intervention under interna-
tional law indicate that the United States failed to consider international
legal rules and principles prior to acting. Instead, the State Department
sought to manufacture a plausible rationale for the intervention after the
missile strikes. International law clearly was an afterthought in the U.S.
decision to intervene militarily in Iraq. In addition, the explanations
which were offered by the State Department to justify the intervention
were inconsistent and unconvincing."' This suggests that despite wide-
spread criticism of its actions, the United States was wholly unconcerned,
both before and after the intervention, as to whether its actions were in
accordance with international legal norms and customs.
Because both the intervention in question and a similar intervention
in 1993 have not resulted in any substantial repercussions for the United
States, there exists the possibility that a precedent for unilateral military
intervention has been set. Over time this precedent may coalesce into
customary international law. If this occurs, nations other than the
United States could justifiably intervene militarily in the affairs of other
181. See Oscar Schacter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 113, 123 (1986) ("[F]or virtually every use of force, the responsible state has sought to
justify it under the accepted [United Nations] Charter rules."); Byron F. Burmester,
On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 269, 272 ("[S]tates... scramble to portray their uses of force in terms that
are legally justifiable.").
182. Some of this ex post facto concern for legal niceties was no doubt prompted by the
criticism of the international community at large and allies in particular; however, since much of
the criticism was grounded in beliefs regarding international law and custom, the conclusion
remains valid.
183. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 (listing rationales for the intervention). U.S. uncer-
tainty, ambivalence and ignorance regarding the intervention's validity under international law is
illustrated by the following statement made during a State Department briefing:
I think you'd have to look at 688 in conjunction with, I believe 687, if I have it right.
There are several UN Security Council resolutions that are relevant here. I'm sorry,
678, which says that all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council
resolutions should be employed to restore peace and security. That's a paraphrase.
That's not a direct quote. But 678 and 688 together, I think, form the basis for the ac-
tion we took.
Briefing #141, supra note 9.
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nations. U.S. unilateralism thus bodes ill for the application and en-
forcement of international legal rules of intervention and customary
184respect for sovereignty. If statements made in the aftermath of the in-
tervention are any indication, criticism by other nations has not prompted
the United States to abandon unilateral military intervention as a foreign
policy option.' The precedent set by this action, especially with regard to
the massive extension of the concept of national security, would permit
unilateral military intervention in a myriad of situations. If law consis-
tently yields to raw military and political power, then the validity of the
international doctrine of non-intervention is necessarily undermined.
It may be, however, that the United States, commonly identified as
the sole remaining world superpower, is a singular exception to the norms
of conduct and compliance under international law. 186 The power and in-
fluence of the United States may create a kind of superpower prerogative
allowing it to ignore strictures which other nations must follow. This
might explain the failure of the United States to offer, even after the fact,
a coherent legal justification for its actions. 87 It might also explain why
much of the language used to explain the intervention suggests a marked
ambivalence regarding international law. 181
While it may seem anti-climactic, the political and military failure of
the intervention also suggests that U.S. unwillingness to consider and
follow international legal norms stems in part from an inability to for-
mulate a consistent and rational foreign policy or national security
184. While the Gulf War and UN resolutions regarding Iraq created a unique context
which arguably legitimizes, in part, actions against Saddam Hussein, U.S. statements regarding
unilateral military intervention and reliance on national security interests suggest that such a
context is mere happenstance and not a prerequisite for unilateral military action. See infra text
accompanying note 199; Epilogue (suggesting that U.S. ambivalence toward international law is
ongoing).
185. Events which unfolded in fall of 1997, however, suggested that the stinging criticism
which followed the 1996 intervention may have made the United States more hesitant to bra-
zenly exercise its military might on the world stage, at least as regards Iraq. See supra note 56
(discussing recent Iraqi defiance). However, in acknowledging the authority of the UN Security
Council to enforce its resolutions against Iraq, the United States again reserved the right to act
unilaterally. See Steven Erlanger, Gulf War Alliance: 6 Years Later Seams Fray, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1997, at A6 ("[I]t's harder and harder to sustain support as memories of the gulf war
fades [sic]. And because people know at the end of the day they can count on the United States
to defend the world's interests versus Iraq...." (emphasis added)). This seeming moderation of
the U.S. stance on Iraq was not evident in a still more recent crisis with Saddam Hussein. See
generally infra Epilogue.
186. See Weiss, supra note 70, at 195.
187. Most of the justification came out over time and in response to challenges from jour-
nalists and foreign nations. No single comprehensive statement justifying the attack was issued
by the State Department.
188. Justifications under international law are ambiguous and intermingled with national
security justifications and simplistic generalization regarding international law. See Briefing
#140, supra note 6; Briefing #141, supra note 9.
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strategy, a problem which has plagued the Clinton administration. The
superficiality and inconsistency of the justifications proffered by the
United States suggest that the initial decision to intervene was hasty and
ill-considered: arising from an ideological or political knee-jerk reac-
tion."89 Once the costs began to increase in terms of international
condemnation and the possible risks of continued military engagement,
the United States may have recognized that it had no vital interest in the
area. Such a haphazard national security and foreign policy strategy has
been seen by many analysts as a hallmark of the Clinton administration.' 90
This analysis also explains the inability of the State Department to for-
mulate a consistent, thoughtful legal justification for the intervention.
The shortcomings of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy gen-
erally are in turn linked to U.S. ambivalence and ignorance regarding
international law.' 9' This might explain why an intervention which failed
to achieve any of the stated U.S. goals, strengthened Saddam Hussein,
and incurred virtually unanimous disapproval among the nations of the
world, was undertaken at all. Coupled with the arrogance that comes from
189. At least one country suggested that President Clinton ordered the intervention with
an eye toward the upcoming U.S. elections. See Robert J. Caldwell, Confrontation in Iraq: Sad-
dam Sends a Message to Clinton, Dole, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 12565972 (reporting that France viewed the United States action as politically
motivated).
190. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Pol-
icy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2432 (1994) (discussing the confusion and mistakes which define U.S.
policy in Haiti); Michael Dobbs, CAMPAIGN '96: Despite Risks, Intervention Boosts Clinton,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at Sec. A. ("There has been .a trial-and-error quality about the
Clinton administration's approach to foreign policy... .
In light of recent developments this trial-and-error quality is even more apparent. In a recent
confrontation between the United States and Iraq, the United States consulted at length with the UN
Security Council and sought express authorization for any enforcement action. See supra note 56
(discussing recent Iraqi defiance). If, as this note argues, the 1996 intervention was unwarranted and
mishandled, then these events suggest that the United States may have learned how properly to
proceed as a result of the earlier fiasco. When asked about developments in Iraq, former Secretary
of State James Baker, in an apparent reference to the failed 1996 U.S. intervention, commented:
"[Y]ou don't lob a few tomahawk missiles into downtown Baghdad ... then you really would lose
your coalition." James Baker, Morning Edition (National Public Radio, Nov. 5, 1997) (available in
<www.npr.org/programslmoming/archives/971105.me.03.ram>). However, the latest crisis in Iraq
indicates that any moderation in the U.S. willingness to act unilaterally has dissipated. See infra
Epilogue.
191. The inconsistency of the justifications offered for the intervention and the muddled
understanding and explanation of international law exhibited by the State Department further
evidence the shortcomings of U.S. national security and foreign affairs policies. See Briefing
#140, supra note 6.
I Another indication of U.S. ambivalence regarding the United Nations is its failure to pay its
UN dues. See Barbara Crossette, The 7-Year Gnaw: Iraq Sees Sanctions Backers Straying, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at A6 [hereinafter Crossette, 7-Year Gnaw] ("Washington is crippling the
,United Nations financially by not paying its dues, a measure of the low priority the Clinton
'.administration has put on the need for international support there, many United Nations officials
and diplomats say.").
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economic and military dominance, the U.S. failure to clearly define na-
tional priorities and strategies may result in arbitrary exercises of power
lacking clear justifications or goals. Viewed in this light, the U.S. inter-
vention in Iraq becomes easier to explain and understand.' 92 Saddam
Hussein is an enemy and he did something the United States did not like.
For various reasons, from Iraq's constant battles with UN weapons in-
spectors to its humanitarian record and the international community's
increasing willingness to lessen sanctions against Iraq and allow it to sell
oil, the United States decided it was once again time to send a message to
its favorite bad guy.' 93 The legal justifications were simply meant to as-
suage the United Nations and foreign nations, they did not reflect reality.
This also explains the U.S. failure to follow-up its military strikes when it
became clear that its declared goals had not been achieved. If the intent
was to send a message to Saddam to behave himself, the United States
could confidently declare its action a success once the cruise missiles
found their mark, without reference to the plight of the Kurds, the status
of the oil market, or Iraqi cooperation with the United Nations.
192. See Schork, supra note 51; Scott Peterson, US Move to Protect Gulf Allies Shows
Stateless Kurds Play Second to Oil, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 6, 1996, at 7
(indicating that U.S. actions are wholly inconsistent with U.S. claims regarding to the Iraqi
Kurds).
193. See supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting President Clinton); Briefing #141, su-
pra note 9 ("The idea is... to send a message to Saddam Hussein-a very direct message-that
the aggression that he embarked on could not go unanswered."); Briefing #142, supra note 49
("The response we chose ... was meant.., to send [Saddam] a message."); Myers, U.N. Halts
Deal, supra note 130 ("[Slenior officials insisted that the Administration's focus would remain
on punishing Mr. Hussein.").
Thus, the cruise missile attack was simply another element of the erratic long-term U.S.
policy towards Iraq. The Iraqi actions against the Kurds merely served as a convenient pretext
for a military action intended to further general U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. See
Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("The targets selected by the Pentagon were designed to make it
hurt, to make Saddam hurt; to devalue part of his military machine; to increase, we hope, the
lack of confidence that is clearly present in many parts of the Iraqi leadership, both the military
and the civilian leadership'"); Briefing #141, supra note 9 (In detailing U.S. demands of Iraq
following the intervention, the State Department stated that "[Saddam] continue[d] to drag his
feet in the face of the various demands that the international community has laid out."). The
following exchange at a State Department Briefing illustrates the indistinguishability of the U.S.
military intervention in September 1996 from overall U. S. policy in Iraq:
Q: What is the increased threat that is causing the United States to react in such a
way?...
MR. BURNS: [O]ur efforts against him is a long-term effort. It's already been un-
derway for five years, and if it takes another five years to keep it in place, we will
.... Look at the airstrikes that we launched against him last week. Why did we
choose the air defense targets in the south? We chose that in order to cripple him
militarily, so that in the future he could not engage in any offensive military capabil-
ity, and that was the reason for extending the 'no-fly' zone in the south.
Briefing #148, supra note 39.
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The international outrage prompted by the U.S. unilateral military
intervention resulted in large part from the perception of U.S. arrogance
and unfettered use of force in handling the situation as opp~osed to legiti-
mate opposition to the substantive need for action. Given the
foreseeability of the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq and the magni-
tude of Kurdish suffering, a truly international response likely could have
been put together to address the situation in northern Iraq. A multilateral
response in all likelihood would have been more responsive, effective,
and ultimately successful than the unilateral intervention undertaken on
September 3, 1996.195 Had it truly been interested in resolving the crisis
and addressing the humanitarian and political issues raised by Saddam
Hussein's actions in northern Iraq, the United States likely could have
achieved its goals multilaterally, under UN auspices and in accordance
with international law.
International law did not act as an effective bar to unilateral self-
interested action by the United States; yet, to the extent that widespread
condemnation of the unilateral intervention prompted the United States to
discontinue its military adventure or caused the Clinton administration to
alter its foreign policy in future dealings with Iraq and other nations, the
intervention and its aftermath indicate that the principles of international
law are relevant to relations between States and do impact upon the con-
duct and reputation of nations. If, however, the Clinton administration
learned nothing from its failed missile strikes against Iraq and the inter-
vention serves as a model for future unilateral U.S. military action, then
the influence of international law, at least as it relates to the world's sole
remaining superpower, will be severely undermined.
EPILOGUE: CONTINUED IRAQI DEFIANCE IN CONTEXT
Since the 1996 U.S. military intervention, Iraqi defiance of the United
States and the United Nations has grown more frequent and pronounced.
Saddam Hussein ordered UN weapons inspectors of U.S. nationality to
leave Iraq in October and November of 1997.' 9' As of this writing in
194. Russian "Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov accused the United States of usurping
the UN Security Council by taking on the role of the world's policeman." AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Sept. 4, 1996. The State Department provided a perfect example of U.S. arrogance in
the international arena. See Briefing #140, supra note 6 ("The United States reserves the right to
take whatever action necessary in any situation."); see also Erlanger, supra note 185 (The
United States frequently purports to speak for and represent, by its unilateral actions, the views,
opinion and policies of the entire world.).
195. Given the fact that the intervention actually strengthened Iraq, almost any response
other than what occurred would have produced better results. See generally supra Part I.
196. See supra note 56 (discussing continued Iraqi defiance).
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February 1998, Iraq was unilaterally setting deadlines for the termination
of UN sanctions, denying UN weapons inspectors access to numerous
sites in Iraq, and all but daring the United States to attempt another mili-
tary solution.' 97 In response to Iraq's defiance and ongoing campaign of
invective against the United States and the United Nations, the United
States deferred to a quiescent UN Security Council through the end of
1997. Short of statements of support for the mission of the UN Special
Commission, the Security Council has been unable or unwilling directly
to confront Iraq over its intransigence. Over time, the ineffectiveness of
the Security Council led a clearly frustrated Clinton administration to is-
sue threats of unilateral U.S. military action against Iraq.'9 '
Thus, the recent U.S. stance toward Iraq, while initially suggesting a
new-found respect for the United Nations and international law generally,
has again begun to reflect the arrogance and ambivalence regarding inter-
national legal norms that was evident in 1996. Recent pronouncements
indicate that the Clinton administration would "prefer" to act in conjunc-
tion with the United Nations."9 This suggestion that acting in accordance
with international law is merely a preference speaks volumes about the
U.S. view of international legal institutions and regimes generally.00
The most recent crisis in Iraq relates solely to UN weapons inspec-
tions.2 O' The situation is potentially far more serious than prior squabbles
with Iraq and seemingly demands a response from the international com-
munity. In comparison to the events of 1996, the situation is relatively
unambiguous and uncluttered. There is no specific humanitarian crisis
and Iraq has made no recent aggressive moves which might pose a threat
either to international peace and security generally or other Arab nations
in particular. The only matter in question is Iraqi compliance with UN
requirements on weapons inspections. This fact should make the case for
an aggressive international response to Iraq much stronger. The fact that
the United States remains unable to persuade former Gulf War coalition
197. See Crossette, 7-Year Gnaw, supra note 191, at A6 ("President Hussein declared that
Iraq was in a state of jihad -holy war - with the United States.").
198. See Tim Weiner, Clinton's Warning to Iraqis: Rime for Diplomacy May End, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at A6 (Clinton stated "[w]e have to be prepared to move alone.").
199. See id. (Clinton stated, "I far prefer the United Nations .... But if they really believe
there are no circumstances under which we would act alone, they are sadly mistaken.").
200. U.S. arrogance regarding international law was highlighted by Secretary of State Al-
bright's remark, in regard to a diplomatic trip, that "I am not going anywhere to seek support...
I am going to explain our position." Steven Lee Myers, Albright Says U.S. Could Act Alone
Against Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A6 (hereinafter Myers, Albright Says U.S.
Could Act Alone]; see Crossette, 7-Year Gnaw, supra note 191 (discussing the U.S. failure to
pay its UN dues).
201. See generally Myers, Albright Says U.S. Could Act Alone, supra note 200.
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members and allies to support its call for a military response to Iraq is
even more striking than its analogous failure to muster support in 1996 .
With the current situation in Iraq, the United States is in a dilemma of
its own making. The U.S. failure to gain UN support for a military re-
sponse to Iraqi transgressions of express UN mandates might suggest that
the United States is justified in acting on the world's behalf by unilater-
ally enforcing UN resolutions and international legal norms.23 This view
of the current impasse would, however, ignore the role of U.S. unilateral-
ism in bringing about the current stalemate. If U.S. recklessness in
intervening militarily in Iraq in 1996 shattered the Gulf War coalition and
destroyed Arab trust in the United States, then the present inability of the
United States to muster support for its position within the international
community is unsurprising. Saddam Hussein is fully aware of the demise
of the coalition and the general hesitance in the international community
to follow the U.S. lead. His increasing displays of contempt for the
United Nations are directly related to the perceived weakness of the coa-
lition and United States' inability to persuade other nations to support its
policy toward Iraq. Under this analysis, the United States is faced with an
international crisis of inaction that its arrogance and willingness to defy
international opinion by acting unilaterally helped to bring about.
Past conduct by the United States in Iraq, specifically in 1996, has
helped to create a situation in which the United Nations is paralyzed and
the Gulf War coalition is nonexistent. As a result, the United States may
feel it has no choice but to act, with or without the sanction of interna-
tional law or the United Nations. By acting unilaterally the United States
would confirm the worst fears of the international community about U.S.
arrogance and disrespect for international law. By acting within the con-
fines of the UN Security Council, the body responsible for enforcing UN
resolutions, and refraining from intervening in Iraq, the United States may
allow Saddam Hussein blatantly to disregard international law. While
following the lead of the Security Council might bolster U.S. standing in
international legal circles, continuing Iraqi defiance would surely weaken
both the UN and international law generally. The continuing U.S. inabil-
ity to gain support for its current stance toward Iraq is, at least in part, a
consequence of its prior unwillingness to abide by international legal
norms. At least in this context, then, international law does matter and
202. Ironically, humanitarian concern for the long-suffering Iraqi civilian population un-
derlies much of Arab hesitation to support a military response. See Douglas Jehl, On The
Record, Arab Leaders Oppose U.S. Attacks on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,1998, at A6.
203. See supra Part II (discussing the blurring of the line between unilateralism and mul-
tilateralism suggested by U.S. claims that its unilateral action is in the interests of the
international community).
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does have real world consequences, even for the world's only remaining
superpower.
In the end, the United States in 1996 may have set a precedent for
unilateral action which made future international consensus on Iraq im-
possible and may now require further unilateral military action by the
United States. This paradox perfectly illustrates the dangers posed by
unilateral intervention to the international legal order; unilateralism begets
mistrust and suspicion of the intervening nation, which makes future co-
operation and consensus unlikely, which in turn increases the likelihood
of stalemate when the next crises arises. The frustration of stalemate leads
again to unilateral action.
